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I. INTRODUCTION
Controversy abounds about securities class actions,' centering on the fact
that attorneys operating on a contingent fee basis initiate most such suits in the
names of "figurehead" plaintiffs with little at stake. Some critics charge that
class actions are mostly "strike suits" that avaricious plaintiffs' lawyers file
with a view to coercing settlements from innocent defendants unwilling to
incur the high costs of litigation. Other critics focus on the agency costs
1. Hereinafter we use the term "class actions" to mean class action suits brought under the federal
securities laws. Such actions generally fall within one of four categories: (1) suits under § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, brought on behalf of persons who purchased securities in a public offering; (2) suits
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5, brought on behalf of persons
who purchased securities from defendants who misrepresented material facts relating to those securities;
(3) suits under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 1Ob-5, brought on behalf of
persons who purchased or sold securities at prices influenced by material misrepresentations made by
defendants who neither purchased nor sold those securities; and (4) suits under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5, brought on behalf of persons who purchased or sold securities
from defendants who possessed material, nonpublic information relating to those securities. Suits in
subcategory (3) are commonly referred to as fraud-on-the-market (FOM) suits.
Class and derivative actions brought under state corporate law involve issues similar to those involved
in securities class actions. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (approving settlement
between corporation and shareholder who filed second derivative suit challenging corporate gift over
objection of shareholder who filed first derivative suit challenging gift). However, state law actions involve
unique procedural issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.
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inherent in class actions initiated and maintained by attorneys who operate
without meaningful client supervision. They claim that when class actions are
settled, as most are, plaintiffs' attorneys often shortchange the plaintiff class.
Plaintiffs' attorneys respond to these criticisms by arguing that they
perform a public service and protect innocent investors. Class actions, they
claim, constitute a necessary supplement to the efforts of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to deter securities fraud and provide the only
effective mechanism for compensating investors injured by securities fraud.2
Plaintiffs' attorneys also assert that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that courts approve class action settlements and awards of
attorneys' fees3 and assures that class members' interests are "scrupulously
protected."4
Committees in both houses of the 103d Congress held hearings on whether
new legislation was needed to control class action "abuses" 5 but reached no
conclusions and recommended no legislation. The 104th Congress has already
begun to revisit these questions.6 Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, has
argued consistently that "[p]rivate actions are crucial to the integrity of our
disclosure system because they provide a direct incentive for issuers and other
market participants to meet their obligations under the securities laws."' He
has opposed legislation that would decimate the effectiveness of class actions,
while supporting other changes in the rules governing such actions, "because
private litigation imposes substantial unnecessary costs when it is abused by
private plaintiffs or their attorneys. '
The agency-cost literature, with its emphasis on the absence of effective
protection for class members' interests, first sparked our interest in class
2. See, e.g., Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 103d Cong.. Ist Scss. 141, 145
(1993) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of William S. Lerach).
3. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23.
4. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 143.
5. Id. at 1; see Prepared Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. Commtttee on
Commerce, FED. NEws SERv., Feb. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (hereinafter
Levitt 1995 testimony]; Prepared Testimony of Arthur Levitt. Chairman. U.S. Secunties and Exchange
Commission, Concerning Litigation Under TI-IF Federal Securities Laws. Before the House Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. FED. NEws SERV.. July
22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News library, Cumws File [hereinafter Levitt 1994 testimonyl.
6. See Securities Litigation Reform Topic of Separate House. Senate Legislation. 27 Sec. Reg. & L
Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 116 (Jan. 20, 1995). On March 8. 1995. the House passed H.R. 1058. the Securities
Litigation Reform Act, which would make significant amendments in both the procedures and the
substantive rules governing securities class actions, almost all of which would make it more difficult to
maintain such actions. The Senate appears inclined to adopt a more balanced reform measure. See Senators.
Witnesses Call for Balance in Securities Law Reform, 27 Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) No. 9. at 335 (Mar.
3, 1995).
7. Levitt 1995 testimony. supra note 5. Mr. Levitt also pointed out that "[olur markets are the envy
of the world precisely because they operate fairly and efficiently under a system in which full disclosure,
not inside advantage, is the rule." Id.
8. Id
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actions. We knew that institutional investors own a majority of the stock of
publicly held corporations9 and account for a significantly larger portion of
securities trading.'0 It therefore seemed likely that institutional investors had
similarly large stakes in most class actions. If so, it also seemed likely that
institutions, acting individually or collectively, might be well situated to
monitor the conduct of plaintiffs' attorneys as proxies for all members of
plaintiff classes.
We found that institutional investors' stakes in class actions were even
larger than we thought. The fifty largest claimants in a large sample of class
actions accounted for more than 57% of the dollar value of all claims filed."
More significant, the ten largest claimants in twenty class actions for which we
were able to obtain detailed claims data accounted, on average, for 40.5% of
the dollar value of the claims filed.' 2 The largest claimant, on average,
accounted for 13.1% and the second largest for 6.7%. 13 Data we gathered
from a small group of institutions tended to corroborate these findings. The
two largest recoveries received by the State of Wisconsin Investment Board in
one recent year represented roughly 13.7% and 20.2% of all amounts recovered
by class members in those actions. The California Public Employees
Retirement System had recoveries, over a twenty-one month period, that
equaled roughly 14.2%, 10.0%, and 6.2% of the amounts recovered by class
members in three class actions.'4 Three other large institutions had
comparably large recoveries. Moreover, there are substantial differences, often
amounting to millions of dollars, between the allowable losses claimed by
institutions in class actions and the amounts they actually recovered. 5 This
further suggests that institutions could realize substantial benefits by serving
as litigation monitors.
Of course, institutions would likely find such service worthwhile only if,
as many commentators claim, excessive agency costs pervade class action
litigation. To examine this claim, one must first understand the dynamics of
class action litigation and how they relate to the criticisms frequently directed
at such litigation. Part II describes the characteristics of class actions that have
become the focus of most critics' concerns. Plaintiffs' attorneys, not investors,
9. In 1990, institutions were estimated to own 53% of public and private equity. Carolyn K. Brancato
& Patrick A. Gaughan, Institutional Investors and Capital Markets: 1991 Update 8 (Columbia Institutional
Investor Project, Ctr. for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Sept. 1991).
10. See Supplementary Information to Securities Transactions Settlement, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,891, 52,896
(1993) (estimating that "[d]uring 1992, institutions accounted for two-thirds, and perhaps more, of daily
share volume on the NYSE"); James A. white, Nasdaq Posts a Blistering 56.8% Surge for 1991 as More
Big Investors Pile On, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1992, at 15 (discussing institutions' increasing purchases of
stock in small companies that trade over the counter).
11. See infra text accompanying note 197.
12. See infra tbl. 2 accompanying note 200.
13. See infra tbl. 2 accompanying note 200.
14. See infra text accompanying note 207.
15. See infra tbl. 2 accompanying note 200.
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initiate most class actions. We explain the dynamic that leads plaintiffs'
attorneys to file class actions quickly, often within days of the events giving
rise to such litigation, and note that virtually all class actions that survive
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment are settled.
Part Ill addresses agency-cost issues. Commentators point out that
plaintiffs' attorneys invariably face a choice between maximizing their own
income and maximizing the benefits realized by the plaintiff class and suggest
that plaintiffs' attorneys often place their own interests first. 6 Moreover, both
courts and commentators are skeptical whether courts use their power to
approve proposed settlements and award attorneys' fees effectively to constrain
attorneys' self-serving behavior.1
7
We describe two cases that exemplify the problems involved in judicial
review of settlement terms and awards of attorneys' fees. Then we highlight
three recent cases in which plaintiffs' attorneys agreed to a settlement term that
is highly prejudicial to class members whose claims probably represent, in
dollar values, more than seventy percent of the claims of the plaintiff classes.
Finally, we discuss two criticisms of class actions that relate to these agency-
cost issues: Janet Cooper Alexander's claim that virtually all class actions are
settled on a formulaic basis that takes no account of the merits of the parties'
positions; 8 and assertions, made mostly by representatives of companies in
industries that have been frequent targets of class actions, that most class
actions are non-meritorious "strike suits." We show that the evidence on which
Professor Alexander relies does not support her conclusion. We conclude that
the strike suit claim probably has some merit and involves agency-cost issues.
Part IV addresses the commonly held assumption that no class member has
a large enough stake in the typical class action to justify service as a litigation
monitor. Our data, referred to above, 9 demonstrate the size of the stakes that
institutional investors have had in numerous class actions, and also show that
individual investors with small losses recover a very minor portion of the
amounts paid out in class action settlements.
Part V points out that an institutional investor would find it worthwhile to
serve as a litigation monitor if it were "lead plaintiff," that is, the class
16. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 534-48 (1991); John C. Coffee. Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L REv. 877, 887-88
(1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulation]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivattve Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 685-86 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Economic Theory]; Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Dervatitve Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. I. 17-18 (1991).
17. See, e.g., Bell Ad. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304. 1309-10 (3d Cir. 1993); Alleghany Corp. v.
Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 346-48 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, I., dissenting). aff'd per curam, 340 F.2d 311 (2d
Cir. 1965) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 (1966); Alexander. supra note 16, at 566; Macey &
Miller, supra note 16, at 45-47.
18. Alexander, supra note 16, at 566-68.
19. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
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member whose lawyer is designated lead counsel for the class. We describe
how judicial practices and interpretation of rules governing selection of lead
counsel, provision of notice to class members, and discovery directed at
plaintiffs currently make it difficult and unattractive for an institutional investor
to act as a lead plaintiff, and how other procedural rules discourage institutions
from intervening in class actions and filing objections to proposed settlements.
Part VI proposes new practices, consistent with current procedural rules,
that courts could adopt to encourage institutional investors to become lead
plaintiffs. These practices would allow market forces, not courts, to play a
dominant role in determining who served as plaintiffs' lead counsel in class
actions, how lead counsel would be compensated, and the settlement terms that
counsel for the plaintiff class would be inclined to propose.
Part VII discusses whether institutional investors are likely to participate
actively in class actions if courts begin to interpret procedural rules as we
suggest. We submit that creation of a litigation environment more conducive
to active institutional participation, appreciation of the benefits that might be
realized by acting as lead plaintiff, and concerns about liability for breach of
fiduciary duty are likely to lead at least some institutions to begin to play a
more active role.
Part VIII concludes by noting that constructive institutional participation
also has the potential to alleviate many current concerns about the legitimacy
of class action litigation, and thus might increase significantly the extent to
which such litigation advances the disclosure policies of the federal securities
laws.
II. THE DYNAMICS OF SECURITIES CLASS ACION LITIGATION
Securities class actions serve a socially beneficial function: promoting
investor confidence in the integrity of the securities markets. The SEC has
"consistently stressed the importance of private actions under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws,"' because such actions "ensure that
investors have a meaningful right to seek recovery against those who defraud
them"2' and provide "deterrence against securities law violations" that
supplements "the Commission's own enforcement activities. ' 22 In Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, the Supreme Court endorsed class actions as necessary to
implement "the congressional policy embodied in the [Securities and Exchange
Act of] 1934."23 More specifically, the Court created a presumption that "an
20. Levitt 1994 testimony, supra note 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.; Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at III (testimony of William R. McLucas, Director, SEC
Division of Enforcement); see also id. at 600 (letter from Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC, to Sen.
Peter Domenici, Aug. 12, 1992).
23. 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).
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investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations ... may be
presumed for purposes of a[n SEC] Rule lOb-5 action"'U because otherwise
the predominance of individual issues would preclude maintenance of class
actions to enforce Rule 10b-5.25
Courts sometimes refer to plaintiffs as private attorneys general enforcing
compliance with policies Congress has adopted,2 but it is plaintiffs'
attorneys, not aggrieved investors, who initiate and control most class actions.
As the Seventh Circuit recently observed:
Securities actions, like many suits under Rule 23, are lawyers'
vehicles.... When defendants' counsel took [plaintiff's] deposition
and learned that she knew little about either the Fund or the case and
had given counsel free reign, they learned only that this case fits the
norm.... Counsel to whom [plaintiff] entrusted the
litigation-perhaps more accurately, who found [plaintiff] to wage the
litigation-is a specialist in the field ....
Attorneys typically have much more to gain from these class actions than
do the investors who serve as named plaintiffs?5 If they settle the case or
prevail on the merits, the court generally will award the attorneys for the plain-
tiff class a fee in the range of twenty to thirty percent of the fund their efforts
have created. 29 The allure of such awards makes plaintiffs' attorneys willing
24. Id at 247.
25. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3). The district court relied upon, and the Supreme Court endorsed. this
pragmatic rationale to support the presumption of reliance. See 485 U.S. at 228.
26. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. Inc., 723 F.2d 155. 168 (1st Cir. 1983)
("[A]n investor.., who brings an action under the securities laws serves the public interest by policing
the securities market ...."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
27. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 908 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1990). rev'd on other grounds, 500
U.S. 90 (1991); see also In re Telesphere Int'l Sec. Litig.. 753 F. Supp. 716, 719 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(observing that class action lawsuits in securities field most often either begin with lawyer or derive main
impetus from lawyer).
28. Some firms repeatedly initiate class actions in the names of "professional" plainuffs who have
widely dispersed and thinly spread stock holdings. Harry Lewis. a retired attorney, is reputed to have been
lead plaintiff in 300 to 400 suits. Andrew Leigh. Being a Plaintiff Sometimes Amounts to a Profession.
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 1, 1991, at 8. One court described another plaintiff who had appeared in
38 class actions as "one of the unluckiest and most victimized investors in the history of the securities
business ... who spends a good deal of his time being a plaintiff in class action securities fraud suits."
In re Urcarco Sec. Litig., 148 F.R.D. 561, 563 & n.l (N.D. Tex. 1993). aff'd sub nom. Melder v. Morris,
27 F.3d 1097 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.. No. 83-6219, 1983 WL
18002, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 18, 1983) (describing plaintiff whose attorneys monitored her securities
portfolio, consisting of more than 250 separate issues and having total value exceeding S500.000, for
possible violations of federal securities laws.)
29. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885). recognized the principle that attorneys
had a legitimate claim to fees payable from a common fund that their efforts had created. Fees in class
actions often amount to 20 to 30% of the gross amount recovered from defendants. See Court Awarded
Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 247 n.32 (Oct. 8. 1985) [hereinafter
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force]; see also Paul, Johnson. Alston & Hunt v. Graulty. 886 F.2d 268.
272 (9th Cir. 1989). But see 13 CLASS ACION REP. 258-471, 526-57 (1990) (reviewing in detail fee
awards in securities class actions prior to 1990 and calculating that fees and costs averaged 15.2% of
recoveries).
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to "bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk ... [so long as they can]
exercise nearly plenary control over all important [litigation] decisions. '30
Thus, although occasionally a stockholder who suspects a securities law
violation may ask a lawyer to conduct an investigation and bring a class action
if it is warranted,31 the usual pattern is for a lawyer who specializes in
representing plaintiffs to take the initiative. The lawyer typically becomes
aware of a significant move in the price of a company's stock following
disclosure of worse-than-expected earnings or other significant, unexpected
information. She then conducts a brief investigation, generates a class action
complaint, finds someone to serve as a "representative" plaintiff, and files the
complaint, often within a few days of the disclosure at issue.32
The portrait of the typical named plaintiff that emerges from the case law
demonstrates that plaintiffs' attorneys recruit most of the investors in whose
names they initiate class actions. In a large number of class actions, plaintiffs
are poorly informed about the theories of their cases, are totally ignorant of the
facts, or are illiterate concerning financial matters.33 In many others, the
named plaintiff has a close relationship to the plaintiff's lawyer or her firm.
34
30. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 3. Courts have acknowledged plaintiffs' attorneys' dominant
role by allowing them, in appropriate circumstances, to seek judicial approval of class action settlements
to which their ostensible clients have objected. See Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 899-900 (2d Cir
1972).
31. E.g., Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 781 (3d Cir.) (plaintiff testified he called lawyer and asked
him to investigate settlement agreement between Hammermill Paper Company and Carl Icahn), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1982).
32. Melvyn I. Weiss, senior partner in a prominent plaintiffs' securities law firm, submitted data to
the Senate Securities Subcommittee on 229 securities class actions that his firm filed from 1990 to 1993.
Of these, 157-68.6% of the total-were filed within 10 days of the disclosures that gave rise to plaintiffs'
claims. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 465-70, 472-502, 538-46 (letter from Melvyn I. Weiss to Sen.
Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and exhibits I
and 5 thereto) (percentage calculated by authors); see also Milt Policzer, They've Cornered the Market: A
Few Firms Dominate the Derivative-Suit Arena, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 27, 1992, at 1, 34 (of 46 class actions
studied, 12 were filed within one day and another 30 were filed within one week of publication of
unfavorable news about defendant corporation).
33. See, e.g., Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598-99 (7th Cir. 1991) (named plaintiff did not
know he was named plaintiff and thought he could recover $100,000 when his stock fell less than $1,000
on bad news); Rolex Employees Retirement Trust v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 136 F.R.D. 658, 666 (D. Or.
1991) (plaintiff unfamiliar with basic elements of case became involved after groundwork of suit had been
laid); Kelley v. Mid-America Racing Stables, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 405, 409-10 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (plaintiffs
largely unfamiliar with facts of case and what they did know appeared to come entirely from counsel);
Koenig v. Benson, 117 F.R.D. 330, 337-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (plaintiff who read, wrote, and spoke only
Yiddish had son explain to him important parts of complaint and did not meet with attorney until well after
basic preparation for suit had been completed).
34. See, e.g., In re Greenwich Pharmaceuticals Sec. Litig., Civ. A. No. 92-3071, 1993 WL 436031,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 1993) (mem.) (plaintiff was father of attorney in firm representing class); Shields
v. Washington Bancorporation, No. 90-11-1, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14373, at *5-7 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 1991)
(mem.) (repeat plaintiff had been co-counsel with attorney and split fees in past). The repetition and
continuity of the attorney-client relationship in such instances free the lawyers from concern with in-person
solicitation prohibited by Rule 7.3(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and DR 2-103 of
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. As one plaintiffs' attorney has stated, "'You're not allowed
to solicit someone who's not your client.... But there's nothing unethical about telling [a client] ha's got
a cause of action.... Someone who's contacted you, you can call in advance [of a suit]."' The
Professional Plaintiffs, AM. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 70 (first ellipsis added, other alterations in original).
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The most common recruitment practice followed by plaintiffs' attorneys
apparently is to maintain a list of potential plaintiffs and their stockholdings.'
Plaintiffs' attorneys' practice of recruiting investors to serve as named
plaintiffs has become the focus of much recent criticism of class actions. This
may reflect long-standing concerns about lawyers soliciting business and
stirring up litigation. The traditional prohibition on solicitation has eroded
considerably, however.3 6 This practice can best be understood not as an effort
to stir up unnecessary litigation, but as the product of a dynamic involving
modem information-processing technology, judicial practices, and attorney self-
interest.
For private litigation to supplement the SEC's enforcement efforts
effectively, attorneys who specialize in representing plaintiffs must participate
in the identification of situations in which suits should be brought. Modem
information-processing technology largely places all plaintiffs' attorneys on an
equal plane with respect to this search function. Any lawyer with access to a
computer and financial databases can monitor the securities markets and wire
services for major stock price moves tied to significant corporate
announcements or events that may signal potential securities law claims. Upon
discovering such a situation, an attorney can quickly download all of the
subject company's public statements relevant to that announcement or event,
together with additional information pertinent to a possible claim of securities
35. See, e.g., Greenfield v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 118. 120 & n.! (E.D. Pa. 1993). aff'd.
22 F3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing attorney's selection of plaintiff from list of potential plaintiffs
maintained by his firm). Some plaintiffs' attorneys freely admit that maintaining lists of potential plaintiffs
"'makes life easier."' Jonathan M. Moses, Lawyer Given to Filing Shareholder Lawsuits Comes Under
Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1992, at Al, A13 (quoting Richard D. Greenfield). Others deny that they
follow this practice and assert that potential plaintiffs seek them out. William S. Lrach. of Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, insists that he does not keep a list of client stock holdings from which to find
plaintiffs, but that clients come to him quickly enough to file suits within 24 hours of the announcement
of bad news. Policzer, supra note 32, at 1. 34. These denials may be accurate, but when a law firm
consistently files class actions within a few days of corporate announcements, it seems likely that if it does
not maintain lists of potential plaintiffs, it has some surrogate doing so or uses a functionally equivalent
device for finding plaintiffs, such as friendly stockbrokers maintaining lists of investors who might be
willing to serve as plaintiffs. Mr. Lerach's partner Melvyn Weiss has testified: "Most of the calls we get
are from brokers, from other lawyers, from institutional investors--they come from all over--and from big
law firms who have friends and clients, and they can't bring the actions themselves, and they say. 'Bring
that action."' Senate Hearings, supra note 2. at 328; see also In re Marion Merrell Dow Inc. Sec. Litig..
[1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98.356 (W.D. Mo. July 18. 1994) (plaintiff's
affidavits stated that broker "referred" named plaintiff to counsel, who had brief conversation with plaintiff
on same day complaint was filed and obtained authorization to sue on plaintiffs behalf).
36. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). held that states could not categorically
prohibit lawyers from sending truthful and nondeceptive direct mail solicitation letters targeted to potential
clients. One district court recently responded to defendants' "clamor about counsel generating this suit
rather than the clients" by reflecting:
In truth, class actions are inevitably the child of the lawyer rather than the client when the
client's recovery is going to be small in relation to the costs of prosecuting the case .... There
are cases in which lawyers find clients and precipitate cases where perhaps no one client would
ever come forward to complain. I suppose lawyers going out to find clients is not the bad thing
it was once thought to be. Legal policy has changed. Perhaps acptance of class actions made
this inevitable.
Williams v. Balcor Pension Investors, 150 F.R.D. 109, 118 (N.D. 11. 1993) (footnote omitted).
The Yale Law Journal
fraud, such as whether the company made a public offering or whether insiders
bought or sold stock during the period in which the firm may have suppressed
or misrepresented material information. If the attorney decides there are
grounds on which to file a complaint, she or her staff can use computers to
incorporate quickly all such information into a complaint alleging securities
fraud.38
Any attorney who goes through this process will be aware that lawyers at
rival firms probably will have engaged in similar searches and may well have
reached similar conclusions. Those firms also will then be in a position to file
class action complaints relating to the announcement or event in question. The
attorney also will know that all such complaints are likely to be transferred to
one district, if necessary, and consolidated in a single action.39 The court then
will appoint one or more of the attorneys who have filed complaints as lead
or co-lead counsel.
Plaintiffs' attorneys prize such appointments. The lead counsel effectively
controls the conduct of a class action, including assignment of work among all
lawyers who represent putative class action plaintiffs. If the lead counsel
chooses to do much of the work herself, she will be able to claim the lion's
share of any fees awarded.4"
Courts most often appoint as lead counsel the lawyer who files the first
complaint.4 ' Thus, plaintiffs' lawyers "race to the courthouse."42 Some
courts follow a different procedure, allowing all lawyers who have filed suits
containing the same or similar claims to decide which of their number the
court should appoint as lead counsel.43 This procedure, too, rewards lawyers
37. See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 80 (testimony of William S. Lerach).
38. See id. Sometimes this process goes awry. See Junda Woo, Judges Show Growing Skepticism in
Class-Action Securities Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1995, at B8 (noting that two complaints, filed on the
date Philip Morris made unexpected announcement and on next business day, contained "identical
allegations" that Philip Morris "had engaged in conduct 'to create and prolong the illusion of (Philip
Morris') success in the toy industry').
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) (authorizing consolidation of "actions involving one or more
common questions of fact" pending in different districts).
40. See, e.g., Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1277 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The lead attorney
position is coveted as it is likely to bring its occupant the largest share of the fees generated by the
litigation.").
41. See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 80 (testimony of William S. Lerach) (explaining that "courts
historically have rewarded the first filed case with control of the case as lead counsel"); Jeffrey Marshall,
He Gains from Banks' Pains, U.S. BANKER, June 1993, at 12 ("'[Ihe primary reason you want to get to
the courthouse first is to be able to run the case."' (quoting Richard Greenfield)); Poliezer, supra note 32,
at 34 ("'The general rule is the first to file is generally given some priority in terms of handling the case."'
(quoting Ernest T. Kaufman)).
42. See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 80 (testimony of William S. Lerach) (noting that plaintiffs'
attorneys "are competitive" and "want to be first to file so that we can control the case").
43. According to the Manual for Complex Litigation, courts should independently assess the functions,
identities, and organization of designated counsel, and should also consider the lawyers' views. Although
these need not be adopted, "Oludges naturally and properly prefer to give special consideration to the
suggestions of counsel in such matters." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 20.224 (1986);
see also Majeski v. Balcor Entertainment Co., 134 F.R.D. 240, 250 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (counsel in
consolidated actions directed to inform court whether they could work out suitable arrangements pertaining
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who file early.44 To promote their efforts to be named lead counsel, plaintiffs'
attorneys, in addition to seeking to be the first to file, sometimes share copies
of their complaints with other plaintiffs' lawyers who will support their
election as lead counsel.45 Within a short time, these other lawyers typically
file additional class action complaints that are identical to the complaints filed
by the first attorney except for the plaintiffs' names and number of shares. 6
If the court then decides to have all plaintiffs' attorneys determine who will
be lead counsel, the lawyers who filed "copycat" complaints support the
appointment of the attorney whose work product they have shared.47
A plaintiffs' attorney who is aware of a potential securities fraud claim
thus faces a practical problem. She cannot initiate a class action in her own
name.48 If she waits until she is approached by an aggrieved investor to file
a complaint, she likely will find that complaints already have been filed by
other attorneys. To have a reasonable chance of being named lead counsel, at
least in a high-visibility case, she needs to file quickly and thus will resort to
one of the plaintiff-recruitment practices described above.
Of course, being the first to file (or being named lead counsel for a
plaintiff class) does not ensure that a plaintiffs' attorney will receive a fee. The
courts recognize that securities class actions pose "the threat of extensive
discovery and disruption of normal business activities"4 9 and thus may have
potential settlement value for the plaintiff class far out of proportion to their
to representation of plaintiff class).
44. In addition, an attorney cannot be sure, at the time she files her complaint, which procedure the
court will use. Consequently, speed in filing will always seem important.
45. Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1277 (3d Cir. 1994) (defense counsel explainng that
"in class actions additional complaints are generated so that the original attorney will have allies when a
vote is taken to determine the lead attorney").
46. See id. at 1276 ("On November 6, 1992, Levin and Sklar filed Jal complaint which replicated the
Greenfield and Strunk complaints except that the names of the plaintiffs and the number of shares they
owned were changed."). Multiple filings, and involvement by numerous firms, also allow plaintiffs' lawyers
to share the financing of class actions and to spread the risks involved. See Coffee. Economic Theory, supra
note 16, at 705. In addition, if multiple plaintiffs file complaints, it is more likely that at least one putative
class representative will be found suitable.
47. Courts sometimes consider competing lawyers' reputations in deciding who should be appointed
lead counsel, in order to ensure that she is capable of representing the class adequately. See. e.g., Weizel
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir.) (noting that plaintiff's attorney "must be qualified.
experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation"). cert. denied. 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
However, most members of the securities plaintiffs' bar are well known to the courts, see In re Activision
Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (referring to "number of well-recognized lawyers
who specialize in plaintiffs' securities litigation"), and can support their applications for appointment as lead
counsel with transcripts from previous class actions that include laudatory judicial characterizations of their
past performance. But see In re Oracle Sec. Litig.. 136 F.R.D. 639. 649 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (attributing
plethora of laudatory remarks about class counsel in fee orders and paucity of other observations to courts'
delight with clearing their dockets of complex cases).
48. Cf. Pope v. City of Clearwater, 138 F.R.D. 141, 144-45 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (dtsquahfying law firm
from representing class where named plaintiff was partner in same firm); L Stuart Ditzen, Richard
Greenfield Is Barred by U.S. Court for One Year. PHILA. INQUIRER. Dec. 23. 1993, at CI (reporting that
Richard D. Greenfield was suspended from practice for one year for attempting to deceive court concerning
his personal interest in plaintiff corporation on whose behalf he initiated class action).
49. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723. 742-43 (1975).
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merit. They have reacted to this possibility by becoming sensitive to the
judicial "interest in deterring the use of the litigation process as a device for
extracting undeserved settlements as the price of avoiding.., extensive
discovery costs." 50 In particular, courts have begun to rely increasingly on
Rule 9(b)'s requirement that fraud be pleaded with particularity to screen out
non-meritorious and inadequately researched class action complaints.5t In
recent years, they have dismissed on motion something on the order of forty
percent of all securities class actions.52
If a class action survives motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment, though, it is practically certain to result in a fee award to the
attorneys for the plaintiff class. Defendants have "exceptionally strong
incentives to settle" any class action in which they are unable to obtain a
judgment on the merits prior to trial.53 Plaintiffs' attorneys have similar
incentives.-' Consequently, virtually all class actions not dismissed on motion
are settled.
III. AGENCY-COST CONCERNS
A. The Absence of Effective Monitoring
Concerns about class actions relate largely to the possibility that plaintiffs'
attorneys seek to advance their own financial interests, rather than the interests
of the investors they purport to represent, not only by taking the initiative in
filing class actions, but by the manner in which they conduct and agree to
settle such litigation.55 No one disputes that a named plaintiff who has only
a nominal financial interest in a class action, especially a plaintiff that an
attorney has "recruited," is unlikely to monitor effectively her attorney's
prosecution of the action or the terms on which her attorney recommends that
50. In re lime Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397
(1994).
51. See 9 F.3d at 268 (requiring plaintiffs to plead facts giving rise to "strong inference of fraudulent
intent"); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting Second
Circuit approach but requiring complaint to allege "with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud").
52. See Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 445-46 (1994).
53. Alexander, supra note 16, at 566. Alexander explains these incentives in detail. See id. at 528-34,
548-68. They include the potentially catastrophic liability that would result from a judgment for plaintiffs;
the risk aversion of individual defendants, who often control the corporate defendant; individual defendants'
ability to settle cases using "other people's money," id. at 566, as a result of the provisions of insurance
policies and rules governing indemnification of corporate officers and directors; and insurers' concern about
the possibility that they will be held liable in excess of policy limits if they reject settlements proposed by
the parties.
54. Plaintiffs' attorneys receive a more certain return on their investment in a case by settling rather
than proceeding to trial. See id at 543-48; Coffee, Economic Theory, supra note 16, at 716-18.
55. Other commentators have questioned whether private enforcement of various securities law
provisions should be maintained. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995),
and Congress, as we write, is considering legislation that would severely restrict or abolish most securities
class actions. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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the action be settled. Indeed, attorneys generally can influence strongly, if not
control, the terms on which their clients agree to settle suits other than class
actions because an attorney's knowledge about the law and how it applies to
the facts almost always is superior to that of her client. 6 In other kinds of
litigation, however, a lawyer's ability to succeed often will depend to some
degree on her client's cooperation." Moreover, the client, in principle if not
in fact, retains the power to accept or reject any settlement her lawyer
recommends. 58 The client also has the power to bargain with her lawyer, in
advance, about the terms on which the lawyer will be compensated.59
None of these constraints is present when class actions are settled.
Plaintiffs' attorneys typically do not rely on named plaintiffs for vital
testimony, do not bargain with named plaintiffs over the fees they will be
paid,6° and do not require named plaintiffs' approval of the terms on which
they propose to settle class actions. 6' The only constraints on plaintiffs'
attorneys are the rules of professional responsibility, attorneys' personal sense
of duty, and Rule 23's requirement that a court (i) approve any settlement and
(ii) determine what constitutes a reasonable fee for the attorney's efforts.
The rules governing attorneys' professional conduct, which bar an attorney
from allowing her own interests, financial or otherwise, to influence how she
serves her client's interests,62 do not effectively constrain plaintiffs' attorneys
in class actions.63 The conflicts of interest inherent in such actions lead some
plaintiffs' attorneys-critics would say most'-to give considerable weight
to their interest in maximizing their fee income when deciding on what terms
to settle class actions.'s The extent of that influence depends on two factors.
56. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement. 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 214 (1987).
57. See Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers. Real Estate
Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents' Rewards, 36 J.L & ECON. 503. 520-21 (1993)
58. See Miller, supra note 56, at 213.
59. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct bar only unreasonably high contingency fees. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1989).
60. Other than agreeing that the client will owe no fee if the action is unsuccessful.
61. See supra note 30.
62. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2(a). 1.7(b), 2.1 (1989): MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL'rY DR 5-101(A) (1981).
63. Proving that an attorney has violated these ethical prohibitions almost always is problematic. In
addition, the collective action and free-rider problems that discourage class members from actively
monitoring their attorney's conduct of a class action also serve to discourage efforts to prove that an
attorney has violated the governing ethical rules. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM. MODERN LEGAL EItics
§ 8-14 (1986). But cf. Jonathan M. Moses, Firm's Trustee Sues Holders' Attorneys. WALL ST. J.. Dec. 1.
1992, at B6 (reporting on suit by bankruptcy trustee claiming that plaintiffs' attorneys in shareholder
derivative action "rushed to settle to get millions of dollars in fees rather than adequately pursue the claims
they were asserting").
64. See Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer. 66
TEX. L. REV. 385, 395-96 (1987); Charles W. Wolfram. The Second Set of Players: Lawyers. Fee Shifting,
and the Limits of Professional Discipline, LAW & CONTEmP. PROBS., \Winter 1984. at 293, 295.
65. One study of 104 class actions found that plaintiffs' attorneys earned a statistically significant
"settlement premium" in cases that were settled compared to the fees earned by attorneys in actions
litigated to judgment. Andrew Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class.Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD.
113, 116-17 (1976).
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One, which no doubt varies considerably among attorneys, is the individual
attorney's personal sense of right and wrong.66 The other is the attorney's
awareness that a court must approve any settlement to which the attorney
agrees and must decide what constitutes a reasonable fee for the service the
attorney has rendered to the class.
1. Judicial Review of Settlements
The requirement that a court approve any settlement of a class action
provides only modestly more protection to class members than do the rules of
professional responsibility,67 largely because settlement hearings typically are
not adversarial in character. Objectors are rare, and often are only "straw
objectors" represented by disgruntled attorneys who have been frozen out of
participation in a case. Judge Henry Friendly pointed out many years ago:
"Once a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link
arms with their former adversaries to defend the joint handiwork ... ,,6' The
same holds true today. Professors Macey and Miller describe settlement
hearings as "pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense
counsel.,
69
Trial judges are not well situated to evaluate the parties' joint presentation
at settlement hearings critically, nor are they often inclined to do so. First, the
judge usually has not reviewed the relevant evidence in any detail and thus is
not in a good position to evaluate independently to what extent it supports
plaintiffs' claims or defendants' defenses. She has even less information as to
how diligently and effectively plaintiffs' attorneys have prosecuted the action.
Plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel, when describing the evidence and their
66. For an example of diligent prosecution of a class action, see In re Software Toolworks Inc., 38
E3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs' attorneys appeal dismissal of claims against underwriters and
accountants despite having secured recovery of $26.5 million-approximately $6.90 per share-from issuer
and officers in connection with $71 million offering), amended, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98630
(9th Cir. Mar. 13, 1995); see also In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 320, 323, 326-27 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (reporting that plaintiffs' attorneys assisted government in locating and recovering substantial assets
secreted by principal perpetrator of securities fraud, which assets were not part of settlement fund); Letter
from Richard B. Dannenberg to Hon. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC 13 (Feb. 2, 1994) (on file with authors)
(noting that certain plaintiffs' attorneys "who are not publicity conscious" have recovered large amounts
that investors lost due to "egregious frauds which are not high profile [and] which are not the subject of
Commission enforcement action"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Claims Made Settlement: An Ethical Critique, N.Y.
LJ., July 15, 1993, at 5 (commending settlement in In re Zenith Lab. Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,617 (D.NJ. Feb. 11, 1993)).
67. See, e.g., Bell At. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (3d Cir. 1993); Alleghany Corp. v.
Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 346-48 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam, 340 F.2d 311 (2d
Cir. 1965) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 (1966); Alexander, supra note 16, at 566; John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 26-27 [hereinafter Coffee, Champion]; Macey & Miller, supra note
16, at 45 ("[J]udicial approval appears to be highly imperfect as a protection for the plaintiffs' interests,
for several reasons.").
68. Alleghany, 333 F.2d at 347 (Friendly, J., dissenting); see also Bell, 2 F.3d at 1310.
69. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 46.
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efforts to the court, will be inclined "to spotlight the... [proposed
settlement's] strengths and slight its defects."7
Second, judges generally feel pressured to move their dockets and have an
interest in approving settlements. Judge John Keenan expressed this sentiment
in In re Warner Communications Securities Litigation when he remarked:
"[T]he court starts from the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost
always better than a good trial. 71 Janet Cooper Alexander notes that judges
"typically display a strong interest in seeing large, complex cases such as
securities class actions settle rather than go to trial and often take an active
role in promoting settlement. ' 72 Lacking any incentive to probe deeply, and
lacking the time and information necessary to do so, it is not surprising that
courts tend to approve almost all class action settlements."
In re Warner Communications Securities Litigation illustrates the extremes
to which courts go to approve class action settlements.74 This litigation arose
after Warner announced on December 8, 1982, that the sales of its subsidiary,
Atari, and Warner's earnings for 1982, would be significantly below projec-
tions Warner previously had issued. The next day the price of Warner stock
dropped by more than one-third. Several securities class actions were filed
shortly thereafter. Plaintiffs alleged that between May 3, 1982,' 5 and Decem-
ber 8, 1982, Warner had knowingly or recklessly issued false and misleading
reports and projections and that various Warner officers and directors had sold
more than $30 million in Warner stock, including $20 million in stock that
Steven Ross, Warner's high-profile CEO,76 had sold between August and
October. Warner shareholders also filed "piggyback" derivative actions in
federal district court and Delaware Chancery Court, alleging that Warner's
directors had violated their fiduciary duties by participating in, permitting, or
not preventing these unlawful, and potentially costly, actions.
Following certification of a plaintiff class and extensive discovery, the
parties agreed to a settlement that called for $17.54 million to be paid to a
settlement fund in the federal securities action ($11.25 million by Warner, $6
70. Bell, 2 F.3d at 1310.
71. 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd. 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
72. Alexander, supra note 16, at 566.
73. This is not to say that the requirement that a court approve a class action settlement is
meaningless. It undoubtedly imposes at least a weak constraint on plaintiffs' attorneys. See Kane, supra
note 64, at 403 ("Mhe rule protects the parties only against the most egregious and blatant abuses."). In
certain kinds of class actions (and in shareholder derivative actions) the parties often are able to structure
settlements that require defendants to commit to largely cosmetic, "corrective" activities and provide for
payment of a substantial fee to plaintiffs' attorneys. See Coffee. Champion. supra note 67. at 24-25.
Settlements of securities class actions are less vulnerable to this sort of manipulation. They almost always
involve payment of some financial consideration by defendants to the plaintiff class.
74. Warner, 618 F. Supp. at 735. Elliott Weiss, a coauthor of this Article, was counsel of record for
the Objector in this action. This account draws on his personal experience in that capacity and reflects his
point of view about that litigation.
75. The date Warner issued its quarterly report for the first quarter of 1982.
76. See generally CONNIE BRUCK. MASTER OF THE GAME (1994) (chronicling career of Steven Ross).
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million by insurance carriers, and $290,000 disgorged in an SEC enforcement
action by two officers who sold Warner stock just before Warner's December
announcement) and $2 million to be paid to Warner, by its directors and
officers (D&O) insurer, to settle the derivative action. The agreement did not
call for any payment by Ross or other payments from the other Warner
officers charged with insider trading. The agreement further provided that the
settlement of the consolidated securities class actions and state derivative
actions filed in federal court was contingent on the Delaware Chancery Court
approving the settlement of the derivative actions filed in that court, and vice
versa.
77
A Warner shareholder who was also a member of the plaintiff class filed
objections to the settlement in both courts.78 He claimed that if the disclosure
claim against Warner had sufficient merit to lead Warner (and its insurer) to
settle for $17.25 million, the insider trading claim against Ross almost surely
also had substantial merit. Consequently, either class plaintiffs' counsel had
relinquished a meritorious claim against Ross for no consideration or (more
likely) some portion of the amount Warner was paying to settle the disclosure
claims represented a payment to settle the claims against RosS.7 9 If the first
were the case, the district court should not approve dismissal of the insider
trading claims against Ross. If the second were true, neither court should
approve the settlements of the derivative actions.8"
The Stipulation of Settlement explained that plaintiffs had decided not to
pursue the insider trading claims against Ross because he had sold Warner
stock to raise funds to pay a substantial federal income tax liability that arose
as a consequence of his exercise early in 1982 of soon-to-expire options to
purchase Warner stock. Objector initially took the position that, even were that
so, Ross' sales still would have constituted unlawful insider trading had he
known about Atari's difficulties when he sold his stock.8'
77. See In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1986); Stepak v. Ross, 11
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1016 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 1985).
78. The objection was filed by Stephen Gross, a federal administrative law judge, who had purchased
10 shares of Warner stock as custodian for his son Andrew Gross. Judge Gross is the brother-in-law of
Professor Weiss.
79. If the FOM and insider trading claims together had a settlement value of $17.25 million (plus the
amount previously disgorged), plaintiffs' counsel, and the class they represented, would be indifferent as
to whether the $17.25 million was paid by Warner, the D&O insurer, or Ross and the other executives
charged with insider trading.
80. Warner's D&O insurance policy provided coverage for claims relating to Warner's allegedly
misleading disclosures and directors' failure to prevent such disclosures, but not for claims relating to
insider trading. From the point of view of Warner's shareholders, it did not matter whether the D&O insurer
paid $8 million toward the $17.25 million settlement of the securities class action, see supra note 79, or,
as the parties had agreed, $6 million toward that settlement and $2 million to Warner to settle the derivative
claims. In either event, Warner would be out of pocket $9.25 million. However, the settlement structured
by the parties purported to provide Warner with a $2 million recovery in the derivative action, which served
to justify derivative plaintiffs' agreement to dismiss that action and Warner's agreement to pay derivative
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
81. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993), recently
confirmed that evidence that an insider traded while in possession of material, nonpublic information is
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The first settlement hearing, in Delaware Chancery Court, involved only
the derivative claim. Objector asked the court to defer any decision until the
federal district court, which had before it the settlements of both the federal
securities claims and state derivative claims, had ruled on his objection.
At the federal hearing, Objector pointed out that the evidentiary record
amassed by plaintiffs' counsel made clear that Warner officials first became
aware that Atari was not performing up to expectations early in 1982 and that
in August-shortly before Ross' first sale of Warner stock--two of Ross'
senior lieutenants conducted an intensive review of Atari and learned that its
sales had slowed substantially, its inventories of unsold video games had
ballooned, and its efforts to develop and produce its own line of personal
computers were close to collapse. While there was no "smoking gun" evidence
proving that these executives had reported to Ross, it seemed likely that Ross
was aware of the problems at Atari before he sold his stock.
Plaintiffs did not depose Ross until after they agreed with defendants on
settlement terms. Ross, in his deposition, denied all knowledge of the problems
at Atari. He characterized his role as CEO as that of a "dreamer," focusing on
strategic and creative concepts, not business operations. Ross also explained,
in line with the already-negotiated Stipulation of Settlement, that he had sold
$20 million in Warner stock in order to raise the funds he needed to pay taxes
due as a consequence of his exercise early in 1982 of soon-to-expire stock
82options.
Plaintiffs' counsel had made no effort to challenge this aspect of Ross'
deposition testimony. Objector directed the court's attention to tables in
Warner's proxy statements for 1979 through 1982, which established that Ross
(i) had not held any stock options that expired early in 1982 and (ii) had not
exercised any stock options during 1982.3
Ross' attorney conceded that Objector's factual assertions concerning
Ross' stock options were correct but then offered an alternative justification,
for which there was no support in the record, for Ross' sale of $20 million in
Warner stock.84 Ross' attorney, Warner's counsel, and plaintiffs' attorneys in
the class and derivative actions all continued to urge the court to approve the
proposed settlement, notwithstanding their concession that the stated factual
predicate for their agreement to dismiss the insider trading claims against Ross
sufficient to sustain an insider trading conviction.
82. See Deposition of Steven J. Ross at 142, 147, In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig.. 618 F.
Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (No. 82 Civ. 8288) (on file with authors).
83. See Affidavit of Elliott J. Weiss, dated July 31. 1985. 10, Warner (No. 82 Civ. 8288) (on file
with authors). Ross had certain exercised stock options in 1981. but his tax liability in connection with
those options, if any, would not arise until he sold the stock that he had purchased See Objector's Reply
Memorandum of Law at 18 n.*, Warner (No. 82 Civ. 8288) (on file with authors).
84. See Affidavit of Elliott J. Weiss, supra note 83, Exhibit I (letter from Arthur Liman to Elliott J.
Weiss (July 29, 1985)).
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was untrue.15 Objector urged the court to disapprove the settlement as
collusive and unfair or, at a minimum, to allow Objector to conduct additional
discovery, including deposing Ross and those involved in negotiating the
settlement.
The court approved the settlement, finding that it was fair to the class.
Concerning plaintiffs' claim that Ross had engaged in unlawful insider trading,
the court reported:
Defendant Ross testified that he had decided in late 1981 to sell a
large enough number of shares of his Warner stock to be able to
realize $18,000,000, thus allowing him to reduce his liabilities
resulting from his exercise of a class of Warner stock options which
were expiring in early 1982.86
The court then rejected Objector's claim as "factually without foundation and
legally without merit,"" stating: "[Objector] ... fails to counter Ross' sworn
contention that he had to sell his Warner stock, in accordance with a pre-
existing publicly announced financial plan, in order to exercise soon-to-expire
stock options and pay the taxes due thereon.""8 Finally, even though the
notice of settlement hearing stated that the federal hearing would consider the
fairness of the proposed settlement of both the securities class actions and
pendent state derivative claims that plaintiffs had filed in the federal action, the
court concluded by advising Objector:
If [Objector] believes that the settlement is unfair to Warner he should
pursue his objection in the Delaware Chancery Court which is
considering the fairness of the derivative settlement and arrangements
between Warner and its management and has the obvious expertise to
do so. This Court is concerned solely with the fairness of the
settlement to the class .... 89
85. Plaintiffs' counsel at no point in the litigation attempted to explain why they had failed to discover,
or to take account of, the facts about Ross' stock options that Objector's attorney found in Warner's proxy
statements.
86. Warner, 618 F. Supp. at 742.
87. Id. at 751.
88. Id. at 752.
89. Id. at 753. Objector had informed the district court that the Delaware Chancery Court had already
held its settlement hearing and that he had informed the chancery court that he intended to press his
objection to the derivative settlement in the federal hearing. Objector had not asked the chancery court to
leave the record open, and consequently that court did not have in its record the information concerning
Ross' nonexistent stock options that Objector had filed in federal court. Lacking that evidence, and perhaps
relying on the district court's assertion that no such evidence had been produced, the chancery court
approved the derivative settlement two weeks later. See Stepak v. Ross, I1 DEL J. CoRP. L. 1011. 1016
(Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 1985). Coffee points out that as a result of this settlement, "the parties most responsible
for the violation of Rule lOb-5 (and the only parties able to profit from the entire set of events) still profi-
ted and escaped the bulk of the financial sanction." Coffee, Economic Theory, supra note 16, at 719 n.134.
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Objector appealed, primarily on the ground that he had demonstrated, and
the proponents of the settlement had conceded, that the factual basis on which
the district court approved dismissal of the insider trading claims against Ross
was false. The court of appeals, affirming, did not discuss the facts. Instead,
it noted the chancery court's approval of the settlement in the state derivative
action (which the chancery court's opinion made clear did not collaterally
estop objector from attacking the settlement of the derivative claims filed in
the federal action and was not res judicata as to those claims) and held that
"because the issue of apportionment ... has been resolved in another
appropriate forum, appellant has had his day in court on this issue."9
2. Judicial Awards of Fees to Plaintiffs' Attorneys
Courts tend to scrutinize plaintiffs' attorneys' fee requests considerably
more closely than they do settlement terms. Perhaps this is because settlements
at least appear to be the product of an adversarial process while, once a
settlement has been approved, no one but plaintiffs' attorneys has much reason
to be concerned with how much of the settlement fund is paid out as attorneys'
fees. Well-represented objectors rarely appear,9' so only the court is in a
position to protect absent class members from overreaching by plaintiffs'
attorneys.92
Courts use one of two methods to determine what constitutes a reasonable
attorneys' fee: lodestar or percentage-of-recovery. 93 The lodestar method
requires the court first to review the attorneys' records to determine how many
hours they devoted to the action and whether that level of effort was
reasonably necessary. Then the court decides whether the quality of the
attorneys' work or other circumstances justify awarding them some multiple
of their ordinary hourly compensation. The percentage-of-recovery method
demands less of the court's time. The judge simply reviews the quality of
plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts, taking into account the difficulty of the case and
90. In re Warner Communications Sec. Utig., 798 F.2d 35. 36 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
Insofar as Objector's goal was to raise an issue of principle, he achieved a small measure of success. Judge
Newman wrote a brief concurring opinion stating that in a similar situation, where the issue of
apportionment of liability between corporate and individual defendants was "appropriately" before a court.
the court should consider that issue before approving the settlement. Id. at 38 (Newman. .. concurring).
Some courts have since followed that course. See Lewis v. Hirsch, No. CIV.A.12,532, 1994 WL 263551
(Del. Ch. June 1, 1994) (withholding approval of settlement because derivative-action plaintiff had not
adequately investigated insider trading claims against corporate executives before agreeing to settlement
that released those executives from all liability for insider trading); SEC v. Shah, [1994-1995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,374 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1994) (holding that it would create
impermissible windfall to allow company president to offset amount he had paid to settle FOM claim
against his obligation to disgorge insider trading profits).
91. Collective action and free-rider problems serve to deter objections from class members. See infra
text accompanying notes 251-53.
92. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
93. See Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 29.
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the result they have achieved, and then awards a fee equal to some percentage
of the fund the attorneys have recovered.
Despite the greater scrutiny, neither method provides investors with much
more in the way of actual protection than does the requirement that a court
review a class action settlement to ensure that it is fair. First, as John Coffee
has explained in detail, neither method fully succeeds in aligning the interests
of plaintiffs' attorneys with the interests of the plaintiff class.94 Second, both
methods require courts to make a crucial judgment-what percentage of the
recovery or multiplier of the lodestar the attorneys should receive-after the
fact and on the basis of imperfect information.95 Consequently, the decision
the court makes is most unlikely to achieve its goal, which is to approximate
the fee that a fully informed client, acting on behalf of the class, would have
agreed to pay the attorney before authorizing her to initiate the litigation.96
Third, judges have been reluctant to leave plaintiffs' attorneys empty-
handed, even when they conclude that those attorneys have provided nothing
of value to the class. In re Oracle Securities Litigation' illustrates this
judicial reticence, and is particularly striking because the judge involved,
Vaughn Walker, demonstrated a sophisticated grasp of agency-cost issues when
he employed a competitive bidding process to appoint lead counsel in the
securities class action portion of that litigation."
In Oracle, as in Warner, a "piggyback" derivative action was filed by
another law firm seeking to hold certain Oracle officers and directors liable for
subjecting Oracle to litigation expenses and potential liability in the securities
class action and for a minor amount of alleged insider trading. Also as in
Warner, the Oracle class and derivative actions were consolidated and the
parties eventually negotiated a linked settlement. Oracle agreed to pay $23.25
million and Arthur Andersen & Co., Oracle's auditor, agreed to pay $1.75
million to a settlement fund in the securities class action. Class counsel's fee,
$4.8 million plus expenses, was established by its winning bid. The derivative
plaintiffs dismissed their claims that Oracle's management had breached its
fiduciary duties and that Oracle should sue Arthur Andersen, receiving in con-
sideration for their dismissal only Oracle's acknowledgment that it had made
94. Coffee, Economic Theory, supra note 16, at 684-91. Coffee argues that the percentage-of-recovery
method does a better job of aligning interests than the lodestar method. Id. at 691; accord Kirchoff v.
Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 324-26 (7th Cir. 1986); Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 50-61.
95. As is the case with settlement terms, the court must depend on plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants
for information relating to the merits of plaintiffs' case and the strength of defendants' defenses. See supra
text accompanying note 70.
96. See Kirchoff, 786 F.2d at 326 (holding that court should refer to private market practices in setting
attorneys' fees).
97. 852 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
98. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (establishing bidding procedure)-
132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (appointing lead counsel); 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (denying
reconsideration of order appointing lead counsel).
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certain changes in its insider trading and revenue recognition policies. Oracle
also agreed to pay derivative plaintiffs' counsel a fee of up to $750,000. 99
In his first opinion evaluating the settlement, Judge Walker pointed out
that "[t]he sole benefit which the derivative settlement confers upon Oracle's
current shareholders is a termination of the expenses associated with [the
consolidated class and derivative actions],"' u in exchange for which
derivative plaintiffs' counsel was requesting a fee of $750,000. The judge had
no problem with the notion that the derivative claims should be dismissed,
agreeing with the parties that they were "virtually meritless,"'' but
questioned whether counsel was entitled to the requested fee. He also directed
Oracle to retain independent counsel to advise its board as to whether the
settlement was in Oracle's best interests.102
Oracle dutifully appointed two disinterested directors to a special litigation
committee (SLC) and retained Latham & Watkins as independent counsel to
the SLC. 0 3 The SLC conducted an investigation and prepared a sixty-seven-
page report (at an undisclosed cost) concluding that the settlement proposed by
the parties was in Oracle's best interests."4
The SLC considered and rejected the strategy of causing Oracle to move
to terminate the derivative action entirely, reasoning that although such a
motion was very likely to succeed, Oracle probably would have to spend about
as much on litigating the motion as the court was likely to order it to pay to
plaintiffs' counsel. The court agreed. 5 The court also agreed with the SLC's
decision to grant a release to Arthur Andersen, finding that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support a claim that Arthur Andersen had been negligent.'0
The court then turned to the question of what fee should be awarded to
derivative plaintiffs' attorneys, noting that they were entitled to a fee only if
the claim they had asserted was "meritorious" and they had provided Oracle
with a substantial benefit. Despite his earlier endorsement of the SLC's
conclusion that there was virtually no evidentiary support for either the
derivative claim or a claim by Oracle against Arthur Andersen, Judge Walker
characterized the derivative complaint as "meritorious," asserting that plaintiffs
had a "reasonable hope" of proving that the defendants in the derivative action
had engaged in intentional or reckless mismanagement.'
07
Judge Walker next considered whether derivative plaintiffs had provided
99. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
100. Id. at 1184.
101. Id. at 1185.
102. Id. at 1190. The judge also noted that if the parties to the class action agreed to sever the tie
between the two settlements, he was prepared to approve the class action settlement. The parties did not
avail themselves of that opportunity.
103. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
104. 1&
105. Id. at 1444.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1445.
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Oracle with a substantial benefit. Their agreement to drop their prosecution of
an action with no apparent merit-which the court's earlier decision had
characterized as the "sole benefit" of the derivative settlement-clearly did not
provide the requisite benefit. Nor did Oracle's changes in accounting and
insider trading policies, "most or all" of which, Judge Walker found, "appear
to have resulted from SEC pressure."'0 8 That left Arthur Andersen's $1.75
million contribution to the class action settlement fund.
Judge Walker had already taken that payment into account when he
calculated the fee payable to plaintiffs' attorneys in the class action. He also
observed that it was "at least somewhat doubtful"'" that any portion of
Arthur Andersen's contribution was attributable to the efforts of derivative
plaintiffs. Nonetheless, Judge Walker concluded that "it is fair to give
derivative counsel the benefit of the doubt and ascribe the [entire] Arthur
Andersen contribution to the derivative litigation"" and awarded derivative
counsel a $525,000 fee and $69,384.76 in expenses."' In short, he allowed
this aspect of the derivative and class action game to be played as it
traditionally has been played."
2
B. Direct Evidence of Attorneys' Opportunistic Behavior
We do not contend that plaintiffs' attorneys derive most of their income
from class actions through opportunistic behavior. Many class actions have
merit and many plaintiffs' attorneys diligently prosecute such actions and
thereby perform a socially beneficial function." 3  But the potential for
opportunism in class actions is so pervasive, and evidence that plaintiffs'
attorneys sometimes act opportunistically so substantial, that it seems clear
plaintiffs' attorneys often do not act as investors' "faithful champion."" 4
108. Id. at 1448.
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 1451.
112. A court that elects to disregard that "tradition" may bear a substantial burden. See BTZ, Inc. v.
Great N. Nekoosa Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,607 (1st Cir. Feb. 16, 1995) (confirming
denial of attorneys' fees to lawyers who claimed they forced corporation to capitulate to hostile takeover
bid). The victorious bidding corporation had agreed to pay a fee of up to $2 million, as awarded by the
court, in exchange for the lawyers' voluntary discontinuance of their suit challenging the target's takeover
defense and entry into a "clear sailing agreement." The trial court concluded that the lawyers had produced
nothing of value for the target's shareholders and denied their fee request. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 731 F Supp. 38 (D. Me. 1990); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp.,
727 F Supp. 31 (D. Me. 1989). The First Circuit reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to
reconsider its decision. Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518 (Ist Cir. 1991). In an
exhaustive opinion, the trial court again denied the fee request. Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 801
F. Supp. 804 (D. Me. 1992). That decision was affirmed on appeal. BT'Z, Inc. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,607 (1st Cir. Feb. 16, 1995)
113. See supra note 66.
114. Professor Coffee uses this term to describe the role plaintiffs' attorneys ideally should play. See
Coffee, Champion, supra note 67.
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Plaintiffs' attorneys can respond to criticisms of specific settlements by
arguing that the critic does not adequately appreciate the relevant facts, or that
the criticism reflects no more than a difference of opinion about the adequacy
of a settlement's terms. The same response is not available with regard to three
recent class action settlements we identified, all of which involved settlement
terms that we believe can be construed only as clearly prejudicial to the
interests of much of the plaintiff classes."
5
In all three cases, defendants agreed to pay an agreed-upon sum into a
settlement fund. Class members were allowed to claim losses equal to a
specified dollar amount for each share of stock they purchased during the class
period. If valid claims exceeded the amount paid into the settlement fund,
those claims would be paid on a pro rata basis, after deduction of plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees and expenses. If valid claims (plus attorneys' fees and
expenses) totaled less than the amount paid into the settlement fund, the
remaining balance would be refunded to defendants.
The "kicker" was in how the parties defined valid claims. If a claimant
with an otherwise valid claim had purchased more than a designated amount
of the corporate defendant's stock, the settlement notices stated, defendants had
a right to establish that that claimant "is not entitled to the presumption of
reliance, as described by the United States Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, . . . and did not actually rely on the alleged misrepresentations or
omissions in making the purchase decision."'" 6 The notices all stated that
class members who filed claims in excess of these ceilings would be required
to submit additional information to show that the claimant "actually relied on
any alleged misrepresentation or omission with respect to [claimant's purchases
of defendants' stock]."'" 7 Unless claimants elected to reduce their claims to
the ceiling amounts, they would be required to provide this information within
twenty days after it was requested, unless the claims administrator, for good
cause shown, granted a claimant an extension.
115. Notice of Pendency of Action, Class Action Determination, Proposed Scttlement. Settlement
Hearing and Right To Share in Settlement or To Request Exclusion. Trief v. Dun & Bradsirect Corp..
No. 89 Civ. 1741 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1993) [hereinafter D&B Notice]; Notice of Class Ccrtification and
Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class Action and Hearing. In re TCBY Sec. Liug.. No. LR-C-90-608
(E.D. Ark. June 8, 1992) [hereinafter TCBY Notice]; Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class
Action and Settlement Hearing, In re Beverly Enters. Sec. Litig.. No. CV 88-01189 RSWL (Tx) (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 24, 1992) [hereinafter Beverly Notice].
Other recent class action settlements may well include provisions similar to those discusscd in the
text. We asked a number of institutional investors if they were aware of settlements that involved provisions
similar to those discussed in the text, and were advised of no additional such settlements. We did not
otherwise attempt a comprehensive survey of the terms of recent settlements.
116. TCBYNotice, supra note 115, 1 6(b); see also Beverly Notice. supra note 115. 6(b). The D&B
Notice includes a similar provision. See D&B Notice, supra note 115. 1 15. The designated ceilings were
$43,750 and $1250 for the two subclasses in the Beverly Enterprises Securities Litgaton; S12,750.
$12,250, and $500 for the three subclasses in the TCBY Securities Litigation; and S25,000 in Tnef v. Dun
& Bradstreet.
117. TCBY Notice, supra note 115, 6(b); see also D&B Notice. supra note 115. '1 14(b); Beverly
Notice, supra note 115, 6(b).
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Defendants, within twenty days of receipt of the requested information,
had the right to serve on any claimant who provided such information a notice
of challenge." 8 Unless the claimant then requested a hearing, the claims
administrator would deny its claim. If a claimant requested a hearing,
defendants were entitled to seek discovery relating to the claimant's reliance
on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. Notably, claimants were advised
that they would be responsible for paying their own costs in connection with
this procedure, including the cost of retaining counsel in connection with such
discovery and the reliance hearing. "Class counsel [does not] have any
obligation to act with respect to any such challenge ... ."119
Claims data we have gathered relating to other class actions suggest that
these reliance provisions probably applied to well over half the dollar value of
all claims eligible to be filed in these actions. 2 ' From the perspective of the
investors eligible to file those claims, these provisions are highly objection-
able.12' Initially, they represent what might most accurately be described as
"defendants' strike suits"--assertion by defendants of a defense on which they
have almost no chance of prevailing, accompanied by the threat that they will
saddle class members with substantial costs and legal fees, for the purpose of
coercing those class members into dropping or reducing meritorious claims. A
brief review of the law of reliance makes clear why this is so.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson held that, because a stock's market price reflects all
publicly available information, a court may presume that all members of the
plaintiff class in suits based on alleged material misrepresentations relating to
public companies had relied on those misrepresentations. 122 The Court further
held that "[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his
decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the
118. The provisions in the D&B settlement were substantially less objectionable than those in Beverly
and TCBY, in that the D&B settlement specifies that in no event will defendants receive a refund of more
than $5 million of the $20 million paid into the settlement fund, D&B Notice, supra note 115, 12, and
provides that defendants can only challenge claimants' reliance for "good cause," id. J 15. The $25,000
threshold limited the applicability of the reliance provision to claimants who had made investments of more
than $I million. Letter from Edward Labaton, lead counsel for plaintiffs in D&B, to Elliott Weiss 1 (Jan.
12, 1995) (on file with authors). The good faith requirement resulted in defendants challenging only
claimants who failed to supply any information. Id. Class counsel received copies of all challenges and
wrote letters to claimants urging them to respond and offering to assist them in doing so. Id. Class counsel
advised the authors that they were aware of no case in which a challenge was not withdrawn when a
claimant supplied the specified data. Id. at 1-2.
119. D&B Notice, supra note 115, 15; TCBYNotice, supra note 115, 7; Beverly Notice, supra note
115, 7.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 197-98.
121. Notably, no investor has objected to these settlement provisions. That may be due to ignorance
as to the holding of Basic or to the fact that most institutional investors delegate responsibility for handling
settlement notices and completing proofs of claim to clerical personnel. Lawyers representing institutional
investors with whom we have discussed these reliance provisions all have termed them highly
objectionable.
122. 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
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presumption of reliance."' 3 Basic provided three examples of how a
defendant in a fraud-on-the-market (FOM) suit could rebut this presumption.
First, a defendant could prove that the plaintiffs were privy to the truth and
thus had not been deceived by the defendant's misrepresentations."z Second,
if corrective or omitted information had dependably entered the market and
dispelled the effects of defendant's misrepresentations, those misstatements
would not have distorted the price of the securities in question."z Third,
defendants could prove that a claimant would have purchased or sold
defendant's securities, at the same price, even had she known that defendant's
statements were false or misleading.'2
Justice White, dissenting, observed that these defenses were largely
illusory, that "rebuttal is virtually impossible in all but the most extraordinary
case."' 127 Analysis demonstrates that White's observation was correct. The
first defense, in essence, amounts to proof that a claimant traded on the basis
of material, nonpublic information. Such cases rarely arise; when they do,
defendants often will have difficulty marshaling proof of such insider trading.
If the second defense pertains, plaintiffs will have suffered no damages and,
in all likelihood, no suit will have been brought. The third defense applies only
to irrational investors-those who, for idiosyncratic reasons, purchase securities
without regard to whether they are overpriced or sell securities without regard
to whether they are underpriced. All three represent null, or close to null,
sets.'28 Defendants in FOM suits nonetheless clearly have a right to attempt
to rebut the presumption of reliance. It does not follow, however, that it is
reasonable for plaintiffs' attorneys to agree to include reliance provisions in
class action settlements.
Reliance provisions are also objectionable because class members with
claims above the ceiling amounts, unless they are knowledgeable about Basic's
discussion of the presumption of reliance, are likely to read a reliance
provision in a settlement notice as stating, in essence: "You had better reduce
your claim to the ceiling amount unless you can prove that you actually relied
on defendants' alleged misrepresentations (which the settlement agreement
does not describe and which defendants continue to maintain they did not
make). Otherwise, your claim will be denied. Even if you can prove reliance,
defendants are likely to force you to incur legal costs and expenses substan-
123. Id at 248.
124. Id
125. Id at 248-49.
126. Id at 249.
127. Id at 256 n.7 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
128. In no reported post-Basic case has a defendant succeeded in rebutting the presumption of reliance,
nor has any court allowed a defendant to use any defense other than the three listed by the Court to rebut
that presumption. See Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 .2d 290. 299 (5th Cir. 1990). cert.
dismissed, 502 U.S. 976 (1991); Rand v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 200. 205 (D. Mass. 1994);
In re Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. Sec. Utig., 838 F. Supp. 109. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Guenther v.
Pacific Telecom., Inc., 123 F.RD. 333, 337 (D. Or. 1988).
1995] 2077
The Yale Law Journal
tially in excess of any amount you are likely to recover from this action."
Defendants' requests for additional information appear designed to produce
similar inferences.129 They include no explanation of the holding of Basic,
much less of its import. They demand that the claimant state, for each purchase
of defendants' stock during the class period, "the primary reasons why you
purchased the stock at the time you purchased it and what you relied on in
making your decision to purchase."'
30
Many claimants entitled to file claims in excess of the ceiling no doubt
reduced their claims from the start. Many more probably did so after receiving
these requests. Some may have doubted that they could prove that they
actually relied on defendants' alleged misrepresentations or omissions, even
assuming that they could find out what those misrepresentations and omissions
were. Many more may have questioned whether they could prove that
defendants were responsible for those misrepresentations or omissions. Almost
all were likely to conclude that, even if they could prove that they relied on
material misrepresentations or omissions for which defendants were
responsible, the costs of doing so almost surely would exceed the value of
their claims. Few were likely to realize that, if they responded that they
purchased defendants' stock in reliance on the integrity of its market price,
defendants probably would have had no reasonable ground on which to
challenge their claims.1
3'
We find plaintiffs' attorneys' acquiescence to the inclusion of reliance
provisions in these settlement agreements very troubling. Plaintiffs' attorneys'
fiduciary duties run to all members of the plaintiff class. In these cases,
however, plaintiffs' attorneys agreed to a settlement term that threatened to
impose substantial litigation expenses on class members who almost certainly
accounted for more than half the dollar value of class members' claims. There
is no indication that defendants in these cases possessed any evidence
suggesting that any class member was not entitled to the presumption of
reliance.' 2 Absent such evidence, inclusion of these provisions can only be
129. See Request for Additional Information, Trief v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., No. 89 Civ. 1741
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1994); Request for Additional Information, In re TCBY Sec. Litig., No. LR-C-90-608
(E.D. Ark. Oct. 14, 1992). We were advised that the request in Beverly was also much the same.
130. Request for Additional Information at 2, Dun & Bradstreet, No. 89 Civ. 1741; Request for
Additional Information at 3, TCBY, No. LR-C-90-608.
131. An attorney at one institution advised us that, in the one instance in which that institution was
faced with completing such a request, it had elected to reduce its claim because the institution had no way
of proving that it had relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations. An attorney at another institution
advised us that his institution took a different tack. In two cases in which the institution was asked for
additional information, it objected directly to defendants' counsel. In one, where the institution remained
a substantial shareholder, the defendant corporation withdrew the request. In the second, the institution
agreed to reduce its claim, which was far above the ceiling, by five percent.
132. The notices of settlement make no reference even to allegations to this effect, nor do they indicate
that defendants deposed any members of the plaintiff class. D&B Notice, supra note 115; TCBY Notice,
supra note 115; Beverly Notice, supra note 115. Even if defendants had evidence suggesting they could
rebut the presumption of reliance as to certain class members, plaintiffs' attorneys, at a minimum, should
have insisted that the notice of settlement explain to class members the import of Basic's presumption and
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explained as a concession that plaintiffs' attorneys made to defendants in order
to secure their agreement to settle these cases. But if that is so, then plaintiffs'
attorneys should not have requested fee awards based on the maximum
payments by defendants into the settlement funds while assuming no
responsibility for the legal expenses or costs that class members with the
greatest part of the class' claims would have to incur to litigate reliance issues.
C. Other Concerns Relating to Settlements
Two other criticisms of class actions deserve attention; both suggest that
the most significant problem is not that cases are settled on unfair terms or for
inadequate amounts, but that most class actions lack merit. Were that the case,
the most appropriate strategy probably would be to abolish securities class
actions or to reduce substantially the circumstances in which they can be
brought. After all, class actions that lack merit do not serve any compensatory
or deterrent function.'33 Their principal effect is to impose an unjustified
"tax" on public corporations and indirectly on investors.' Non-meritorious
claims that have settlement value also may discourage firms from voluntarily
disclosing information of interest to investors 35  or from engaging in
economically beneficial transactions. As SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has
noted, they also may "breed cynicism about the efficacy of private rights of
action as a deterrent to wrongdoing"' 36 and may "adversely affect the
development of substantive securities law, as courts develop broad doctrines
in an attempt to curb what they perceive to be vexatious litigation."'"
Investors presumably would prefer to have abolished their right to bring
non-meritorious claims. They would realize that while such action would
eliminate the occasional payments that they now receive from class action
the grounds on which defendants would be entitled to question whether they were entitled to its benefit.
133. Recoveries realized from non-meritorious class actions provide investors with windfalls, not
compensation for losses they have incurred as a consequence of defendants' wrongdoing. Settlements
extracted without regard to whether defendants have violated the securities laws are not likely to deter such
violations.
134. The analogy to a tax is particularly apt because most class action settlements are funded largely
by D&O insurance policies, which virtually all public corporations purchase. Thus the costs associated with
such litigation are spread among all public corporations and, indirectly, among all their shareholders.
135. See Udayan Gupta & Brent Bowers. Small Fast-Growth Firms Feel Chill of Shareholder Suits.
WALL ST. J., Apr. 5. 1994, at B2.
136. STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SEC. OF THE COMM. ON BANKING. Hous. AND URBAN AFFAIRS.
103D CONG., 1ST SESS., PRIVATE SECURITES LmGATION 59 (1994) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT] (prepared
at direction of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd).
137. Levitt 1995 testimony, supra note 5. In his testimony before the committee in 1994. Chairman
Levitt seemed to imply that the Supreme Court's decisions in Lampf. Pleva. Lipkind. Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). and Central Bank of Denver. N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.
N.A., 114 S. CL 1439 (1994). reflected such concerns. See Levitt 1994 testimony. supra note 5. Similar
concerns may lie behind some courts' decisions to dismiss what appear to be clearly meritorious class
actions. See. e.g., Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 1994) (reversing and remanding
district court's dismissal of complaint alleging corporation had issued financial statements that substantially
overstated sales in violation of generally accepted accounting principles).
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settlements, viewed ex ante they are as likely to be on the losing as the
winning side of any such settlements. They also would appreciate that the only
real beneficiaries of non-meritorious class actions are lawyers-the plaintiffs'
attorneys who initiate such suits and generally receive twenty to thirty percent
of any amounts recovered, and defendants' attorneys, who most observers
believe are paid roughly equivalent amounts.
1. Do the Merits Matter when Class Actions Are Settled?
In a noted law review article, Janet Cooper Alexander describes how
plaintiffs' attorneys and courts act with respect to class action settlements in
terms that comport well with our description. But Alexander goes on to make
a much more ambitious claim-that most participants in class actions not only
have strong incentives to settle, but customarily settle such actions on a
formulaic basis that gives no weight to the merits of the parties' positions.,
38
If this claim is true, it would seem to follow that most class actions lack merit.
After all, if defendants are prepared to pay the same proportion of claimed
damages to settle both meritorious and non-meritorious suits, one would expect
plaintiffs' attorneys to bring many weak or non-meritorious suits. With
recovery assured, it would not pay for them to take the time and effort
necessary to sort out whether a suit had merit before filing a complaint.'39
Alexander rests her conclusion on analysis of settlements of eight class actions
brought against computer-related companies that made initial public offerings
(IPOs) in 1983. She found that six of the eight cases settled for "remarkably
similar" percentages of the damages at stake and that the other two settled for
lesser percentages for reasons unrelated to the merits. 40 She concludes that
"the most likely explanation for the similarity of outcomes is that the merits
did not affect the settlement amounts.''
Other commentators have pointed out that Alexander's conclusion is
suspect because her sample was so small 42 and because other studies of
138. Alexander, supra note 16, at 566-68.
139. We should note that Alexander does not push her claim this far. She argues only that the merits
do not matter when class actions are settled. See id. As explained in the text, however, the logical
implication of her claim is that many class actions lack merit, and that is how some critics of class actions
have interpreted her study. See, e.g., In re Urcarco Sec. Litig., 148 F.R.D. 561, 566 (N.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd
sub nom. Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097 (5th Cir. 1994). Alexander herself has elsewhere acknowledged
that securities class actions have an important deterrent function, and that studies of settlement may
understate the compensatory benefit of such actions. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance
Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17 (1993) [hereinafter
Alexander, Lawsuit Avoidance Theory].
140. Alexander, supra note 16, at 507, 514-21. One of the outliers involved a company where the only
source of recovery was the defendant's D&O insurance. In the other, market-related events made it clear
that plaintiffs could not hope to recover a significant portion of their theoretical maximum damages.
Alexander also noted a ninth case, which had not settled at the time she wrote her article.
141. Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
142. Seligman, supra note 52, at 453. It also is notable that in a more recent article, Alexander argues
that a drop in the price of an IPO is not a sufficient condition to bring on a class action, but that plaintiffs
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class actions have found significant correlations between the strength of
plaintiffs' claims and the amounts plaintiffs have recovered.143 We offer
more direct criticism of Alexander's analysis.
Alexander concedes that the six defendant companies "were in the same
or closely related industries," made relatively contemporaneous stock offerings
"at similar stages of their development," and thus were "subject to similar
product market, stock market, and economic forces."'" But she asserts that
it was improbable that plaintiffs' claims had similar merit in all six cases,
because it seems unlikely that all defendants were responsible for
misrepresentations of similar magnitude or that the evidence relating to all
defendants' degree of culpability was the same."5 Moreover, she opines, "it
appears that some of the cases were stronger than others on the facts."'"
Alexander's reasoning fails to consider critical features of plaintiffs'
claims. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,' 4' which all plaintiffs
invoked, provides that if a registration statement contains a single material
misrepresentation, the issuer will be liable, regardless of fault.'"4 Thus, if
each of the six cases involved at least one material misrepresentation, the
relative magnitude of those misrepresentations would not matter.
4 9
Other features of § 11 also tend to produce relatively uniform outcomes
in cases in which a material misrepresentation probably will be proved. The
underwriters of each offering, certain of the issuer's officers, and the issuer's
directors all are jointly and severally liable unless they are able to prove that
they exercised due diligence in preparing the registration statement. The
corporate and individual defendants' liability is set by law as the difference
between the price at which the securities were sold in the IPO and the price
at which they were trading on the date on which suit was brought.'-"
Defendants, if liable, can reduce the amount of their liability only by proving
use a transaction cost/expected value analysis to decide whether to sue. Alexander. Lawsuit Avoidance
Theory, supra note 139, at 28-29.
143. See Steven P. Marino & Ren(e D. Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities Class Acion
Settlements Involving Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters. 22 SEC. REG. L REv. 115 (1994).
144. Alexander, supra note 16, at 509.
145. Id. at 514.
146. Id at 523.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
148. Alexander's comments about the differences in the strength of the six cases would be pertinent
had she compared the settlements to the damages that plaintiffs theoretically could have recovered under
Rule lOb-5. However, estimating Rule lOb-5 damages, which equal investors' -out-of-pocket- losses. see
Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 E2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971). often is problematic. Consequently, Alexander
compared the settlements to damages recoverable under § 11. Given that choice, § II. not Rule IOb-5,
provides the appropriate framework for evaluating the comparative strength of the plaintiffs' claims.
149. Of course, where no court has held that a material misrepresentation was made, the settlement
value of a case would be affected by the number of misrepresentations a plaintiff believed a registration
statement contained and how clear it was that those misrepresentations were material.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
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negative causation-that all or part of any decline in the securities' value was
due to other causes.'
51
Given this statutory framework, we consider it significant that, as
Alexander notes, the six companies Alexander studied all made their IPOs
during a boom period for computer industry IPOs, "at an earlier stage in their
development than had previously been the rule,"' 52 and "at 'fantastically
inflated prices. ' ''53 However, Alexander gives these facts no weight. She
also fails to mention a phenomenon that was so widespread during the period
at issue that industry observers coined a new term, "vaporware," to describe
it: computer companies announcing, and then failing to bring to market, "hot"
new products. 5'
In short, it seems highly plausible that all six defendant companies'
registration statements contained at least one material misrepresentation relating
to either the development of the company's products, the risks involved in
bringing those products to market, the time at which those products would be
brought to market, or the competition the company would face. Alexander's
observation that the declines in the companies' stock prices were due to
"unforeseen technical problems or stronger than anticipated competition"'55
renders the plausible probable. That plaintiffs' principal allegation in all cases
was that the companies' offering documents "did not adequately disclose risks
that would prevent the company from succeeding"' 56 further increases the
likelihood that all six cases involved claims of roughly equal merit, at least
with regard to the issuer defendants.
Moreover, at least some of the other defendants in all six cases probably
would have found it difficult to establish due diligence defenses, assuming that
the companies' registration statements all contained at least one material
misrepresentation.'57 In any event, if a defendant company had sufficient
resources to pay any damages plaintiffs were likely to receive, the individual
defendants' defenses would not have mattered much to plaintiffs.' 58
Consequently, even if we accept Alexander's claim that the six cases settled
151. Id.
152. Alexander, supra note 16, at 507.
153. Id. at 508 n.28 (quoting It's the Morning After for Venture Capitalists, Bus. WK., Sept. 24, 1984,
at 118).
154. See Tom Shea, Developers Unveil "Vaporware", INFOWORLD, May 7, 1984, at 48 (new term
describes products announced long before ready).
155. Alexander, supra note 16, at 508 (quoting Michael Blumstein, New Issues: Market Slumps, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1984, at DI).
156. Id. at 509 n.36.
157. Unless such misrepresentations were due to the negligence of low-level employees, which seems
unlikely, they almost certainly were the fault of one or more of the potential individual defendants. See Jim
Bartimo, Stoking the Micro Fire, INFOWORLD, Dec. 3, 1984, at 47, 48 (attributing rush to go public of
companies selling "vaporware" to pressure from venture capital firms to liquidate their investments In
computer industry start-ups).
158. The defendant companies would have a stake in this issue because if those defendants could not
establish due diligence defenses, they would be jointly and severally liable with the companies and could
be made to contribute to any damage award. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1988).
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for very similar percentages of the maximum damages available to plaintiffs,
those results would not appear to be particularly "remarkable."' t 9
But Alexander's analysis of the six cases ignores the possibility that all six
defendants would have succeeded in proving negative causation-that the
declines in the price of their stocks resulted from causes other than defendants'
misrepresentations. Alexander states that so adjusting her computations "would
open the door both to manipulation of the results and to taking the merits into
account in determining the stakes. 't It is not clear why that is so. Courts
generally accept evidence of a decline in an index made up of stock issued by
comparable companies as proof of negative causation.' 6' The necessary
calculations are largely mechanical once one has decided which index to use.
Alexander notes that the indices of high technology stocks were extremely
volatile during the period relevant to the cases she studied. "62 One can
recalculate the "maximum stake" involved in the six cases Alexander
studied 63 to take account of changes in what we believe to be the most
relevant such index, the Hambrecht and Quist High Technology Index (H&Q
Index). The adjustment would reflect changes in the index between the dates
on which the six companies offered stock to the public and the dates on which
suits were brought.' 64 A recalculation of the amounts for which the six cases
settled as a percentage of those adjusted maximum stakes produces a picture
dramatically different from the one that Alexander presents:
159. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 136, at 152 n.371 (analyzing Alexander's claim in sinular terms);
see also Alexander, supra note 16, at 532-33 n.137 (acknowledging these characteristics of litigation under
§ 11).
160. Alexander, supra note 16. at 519 n.71.
161. See, e.g., Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 407-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Fet v- L.asco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544. 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); cf. Akerman v. Oryx Communications.
Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 342-43 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiffs* unreliable statistics failed to suggest that
stock decline actually resulted from misstatement). Alexander herself relies on evidence of negative
causation to explain the result in one of her two outlier cases, pointing out that one company's stock price
declined by nearly 30% immediately after the IPO and before any adverse information was disclosed. See
Alexander, supra note 16, at 518.
162. Alexander, supra note 16, at 507, 508-09 (noting that Hambrccht & Quist High Technology
Index (H&Q Index) declined 45% from June 1983 to November 1984).
163. Id. at 517 tbl. 4.
164. Alexander computed the maximum damages at stake by multiplying the difference between the
price at which stock was offered and the price of that stock at the time suit was brought by the number of
shares sold in the IPO. Princeton Ventures Research recalculated those stakes by determining the dates of
the relevant IPOs and lawsuit filings and the value of the H&Q Index on those dates It then adjusted the
difference between the stock's price on those dates to reflect changes in the H&Q Index. Tables prepared
by Princeton Ventures Research (n.d.) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Prmceion Ventures Research
Tables]. For example, Alexander reported that the maximum amount at stake in Activision was S19 million.
based on the sale of four million shares at S12 and a closing price of S7.25 on the day suit was brought.
Alexander, supra note 16, at 517 thl. 4. The H&Q Index declined from 871.09 on the date of Activtsion's
offering to 790.01 on the date of suit--a decline of 9.3%. Princeton Ventures Research Tables. supra.
Taking this decline into account, the maximum amount at stake in Activision was $16.02 million.
165. The "Maximum Stakes," "Settlement," and "Settlement (% of Max. Stakes)" figures in Table I
are from Alexander's Table 4. Alexander, supra note 16. at 517 tbl. 4. The "Adjusted Maximum Stake"
and "Settlement (% of Adj. Max. Stake)" figures are from the Princeton Ventures Research Tables, supra
note 164. Princeton Ventures Research made similar calculations for settlements of class actions against
four other computer-related companies that, as with the companies Alexander studied, made IPOs in the
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Company Alexander's Adjusted Settlement Settlement Settlement
Name Maximum Maximum ($ million) as % of as % of
Stake Stake Alexander's Adjusted
($ million) ($ million) Maximum Maximum
Stake Stake
Diasonics 95.69 83.91 25.00 26.12 29.80
Fortune 48.75 51.92 12.00 24.62 23.11
Victor 48.38 43.51 13.00 26.87 29.88
Activision 19.00 16.02 4.75 25.00 29.64
Priam 32.73 8.46 6.75 20.60 79.77
Masstor 29.25 21.22 8.00 2Z35 37.71
TABLE 1. Settlements as a Percentage of Adjusted Stakes
In sum, had the six cases Alexander studies gone to trial, defendants
probably would have succeeded, to some relatively uniform degree, in using
evidence of changes in the H&Q Index to prove negative causation. The
impact of that evidence would have varied considerably between cases, though,
because for some the H&Q Index changed very little between the date of the
offering and the date suit was filed, while for others it changed dramatically.
Taking changes in the Index into account, the six cases appear to have settled
for widely varying percentages of the maximum damages that plaintiffs, had
they prevailed on the merits, realistically could have hoped to recover.
Alexander rests her claim that "the merits do not matter" entirely on what she
terms the "remarkably similar" results reached in the six cases. In fact, the
results reached in those six cases were quite dissimilar. Whether plaintiffs'
attorneys allowed their personal interests to influence the terms on which they
settled these cases, we cannot say. But in these six cases, and we assume in
most others, it is likely that the merits influenced the attorneys' settlement
calculations.
2. "Strike Suits"
Other critics make a similarly disturbing claim: that plaintiffs' attorneys
automatically file frivolous class actions-which they term "strike suits"-
whenever a public company's stock declines by more than ten percent during
some brief period. This, they argue, has led to an "explosion" of frivolous
class action litigation.'6 To support these claims, critics point to the frequent
first half of 1983. The companies, and the percentages of the adjusted amounts at stake for which they
settled, were: Cook Data Services--51.06%; Automatix-38.64%; Televideo Systems-2.57%; and Avant-
Garde--no adjusted loss, but $4.2 million recovered. Id.
166. See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 12-13 (statement of Edward R. McCracken, President and
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instances in which a number of plaintiffs' attorneys have filed class action
complaints against a company within days after a sharp decline or increase in
the price of its stock 67 and to a few instances in which plaintiff's attorneys,
in their rush to the courthouse, have filed clearly inappropriate complaints. 68
Plaintiffs' attorneys and others have refuted critics' more extreme
assertions169 but, as Joseph Grundfest notes, "carving back on these extreme
assertions does not establish that the status quo is an appropriate
equilibrium."'7 0 Strike suits still may be a serious problem. One study found
that forty percent of class actions settled for less than $2.5 million. Concluding
that this amount "is less than the defendants' cost of taking one of these cases
to trial," 1' the authors asserted that such cases were "weak or without
merit. ' 172 In contrast, the staff of the Senate Securities Subcommittee pointed
out that low recoveries "may reflect a different problem in private securities
litigation-class action counsel who settle cases to maximize their own fees
rather than clients' recovery.'
' 73
To get a handle on the nature of the alleged "strike suit" problem, it is
important first to define what one means by that term. We believe it is
appropriate to describe a class action as a "strike suit" if a plaintiff's attorney
initiates the action without reasonable grounds to believe it has merit or,
CEO, Silicon Graphics, Inc.); id. at 19 (statement of Thomas Dunlap. Jr.. General Counsel. Intel Corp.)
(referring to "10% rule").
167. See supra note 32.
168. See Hershfang v. Citicorp, 767 F. Supp. 1251, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (admonishing counsel for
filing complaint comprising patchwork of newspaper clippings downprinted from NEXIS devoid of facts
giving rise to inference of guilty knowledge by defendants). Woo. supra note 38. at B8.
169. See Seligman, supra note 52, at 442-45. At the Senate Hearings, plaintiffs' attorneys produced
data showing that in the period 1986-92, plaintiffs filed class actions against less than five percent of the
public companies whose stock price experienced such a decline. See Senate Hearings. supra note 2- at 871
(letter from William Lerach) (based on report prepared by Princeton Ventures Reseach. Inc.. repnnted in
id. at 878-83); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Class Actions: Myth. Reality and Reform. N.Y. Li.,
July 7, 1994, at 5 (crediting same study).
170. Grundfest, supra note 55, at 734.
171. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 48.
172. Id.; see also FREDERICK C. DUNBAR & VtNrrA M. JUNEJA. RECENT TRENDS It: WntAT ExPL&$s
SETI'LEmENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS AcnONs? (National Economic Research Assocs. 1993). reprinted
in Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 739-75. An experienced plaintiffs' attorney has questioned these
findings. In a letter to the authors, Edward Labaton notes that in one case where investors had economic
losses of $60 million, which he settled for $12 million, Ms. Juneja testified as an expert for defendants that
plaintiffs' losses attributable to the alleged fraud were only $6 million. Letter from Edward Labaton to
Elliott Weiss, supra note 118, at 2-3.
173. STAFF REPORT, supra note 136, at 32. The Staff Report notes that the time value of money may
also explain in part plaintiffs' willingness to settle for a recovery equal to only a small portion of their
losses. Id. at 32 n.75 (citing Coffee, Economic Theory, supra note 16, at 703). The Staff Report also notes
that O'Brien's study and others reaching similar conclusions can be criticized on methodological grounds
and on grounds of bias. Id app. A.
Joseph Grundfest argues that whether defendants settle cases for more or less than their avoidable
litigation costs "is a critical signal of the defendants' own perception of the merits of plaintiffs' claims."
Grundfest, supra note 55, at 741. If defendants pay more than avoidable litigation costs, they cannot
"credibly claim that the plaintiffs' case was totally without merit." Id. Absent information as to defendants'
estimates of their avoidable litigation costs, he claims, one cannot draw conclusions as to defendants'
assessment of the merits of the claims they are defending.
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having initiated an action reasonably believing it was meritorious, the attorney
maintains the action after discovery makes clear the action lacks merit. 74 In
either situation, the action apparently has a negative net present value, since
the plaintiff has no prospect of prevailing on the merits and her attorney
inevitably will incur additional costs by continuing the litigation. Consequently,
the attorney's motive for initiating the action or continuing to litigate must be
tactical-she must expect to extract a settlement from defendants and thus to
generate an award of attorneys' fees.
Plaintiffs' attorneys are able to generate attorneys' fees by initiating or
maintaining strike suits because in most class actions, defense costs are far
larger than those of prosecution. As we have seen, plaintiffs' attorneys can
research and prepare, at relatively modest cost, complaints alleging that
corporations and their managers have engaged in securities fraud.' 75
Plaintiffs' attorneys also can, at similarly modest cost, generate extensive
requests for documents and interrogatories. Defendants almost always must
incur much higher costs to respond.
176
Moreover, even where plaintiffs' claims appear marginal or defendants
produce documents that appear to establish that plaintiffs' claims lack merit,
the malleable, fact-based standards courts use to determine whether information
is material"7  and whether defendants have acted with scienter 178 make it
difficult for defendants to persuade courts to dismiss complaints for failure to
state a claim or to grant summary judgment motions. Plaintiffs often can ex-
ploit "the plasticity of legal rules that lie at the heart of modern discovery'
' 79
to pursue additional discovery, including seeking to depose numerous officials
of the defendant corporation for the purpose of determining, for example,
174. Nevertheless, the pejorative label "strike suit" should not be applied merely because a court at
some point determines a class action should be dismissed. Lawsuits that are dismissed, both class actions
and others, often have been both initiated and maintained in good faith.
It is inevitable that some part of the time a judge or jury will ultimately disagree with a plaintiff
about whether the facts support his right to a judgment, or that a plaintiff will change his mind
about the strength of his case as he obtains better information through civil discovery.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 136, at 13.
175. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
176. "The costs that plaintiff and defendant will typically incur are asymmetric, with the defendant's
costs being considerably greater than the plaintiff's." Coffee, Champion, supra note 67, at 17; see also
Alexander, supra note 16, at 548. For one example of a burdensome document request served on
defendants, see Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 194-223 (reprinting plaintiffs' first request for production
of documents in Tolan v. Adler, Civ. No. C-90-20710-WAI (PVT) (N.D. Cal. received Mar. 28, 1991), a
securities class action). The 105 requests include, for the period January 1, 1989, to March 28, 1991, "All
documents that discuss or refer to profit margins at Adaptec" (No. 103); "All documents contained in any
of Adaptec's customer files" (No. 104); and "All purchase orders, sales orders, invoices, shipping records,
payment records, return records and receiving records, for any Adaptec product or service" (No. 105).
177. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (fact "is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding" on course of
action); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting TSC Industries standard
for lOb-5 context).
178. See 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREAnTSE ON THE LAW OF SECuRrTES REaULATION § 13.4
(practitioner's ed., 2d ed. 1990).
179. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 640 (1989).
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whether their recollections of the events at issue square with the information
disclosed in the documents that defendants have produced.I" Courts have
had little success in policing such exploitation of the rules governing
discovery.'
In re 7"ime Warner, Inc. Securities Litigation '8 illustrates the strike suit
problem. The district court initially dismissed a complaint alleging that Time
Warner had not disclosed certain information about its plans to issue stock in
the hope that keeping that information secret for a time would allow it to sell
that stock at a higher price than otherwise would have been the case. The
Second Circuit reversed, holding that the information arguably was material
and that Time Warner might have believed it could benefit by proceeding as
alleged. 18 3 Several months later, the parties announced that they had agreed
to settle the case for $5.5 million, a pittance compared to the more than $200
million in damages that the plaintiff class allegedly incurred. A lawyer familiar
with the negotiations advised one of the authors that plaintiffs had agreed to
settle only because it was clear the district judge was prepared to grant defen-
dants' motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs did not think it likely they
would prevail on a second appeal. When asked on what basis plaintiffs' attor-
neys could justify demanding a settlement, he replied: "Purely economics."''
Some portion of class actions surely meet our definition of strike suits, but
whether the correct figure is four percent or forty percent we cannot say."
Neither can we identify to what extent strike suits are made possible by factors
beyond the scope of this Article, such as the plasticity of discovery rules and
the fact-based standards courts use to determine materiality and scienter.
We are confident, though, that the strike suit problem has an agency-cost
dimension. When courts review proposed class action settlements, they tend
to focus almost exclusively on whether the plaintiff class is receiving adequate
compensation for the value of its claims. If those claims have little apparent
merit or little evidentiary support and plaintiffs' attorneys have succeeded in
securing a relatively substantial recovery for the class, courts also tend to
reward those attorneys generously."s The prospect of such a reward provides
180. See id. ("Engineers and CEOs tied up in discovery are not contribuung to useful products.
Deposition costs are not measured in time and money alone.").
181. Id. at 639-40.
182. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 1397 (1994).
183. 9 F.3d at 267-71. Judge Ralph winter, dissenting, argued persuasively that it was inconceivable
that defendants could have expected to benefit in the manner suggested by the court. See id. at 272.
184. Interview with confidential source, at John M. Olin Conference on the Law and Economics of
Procedural Reform, Georgetown University Law Center, in Washington. D.C. (OcL 29. 1994).
185. It seems unlikely that the figure exceeds 40%. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
186. See In re Cenco Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 322, 326-27 (N.D. 111. 1981) (awarding fee equal
to four times lodestar where contingency factor was "very high"): Galdi Sec. Corp. v. Propp. 87 F.R.D. 6.
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("The lower the probability of success, the higher the bonus should be.-).
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plaintiffs' attorneys with the incentive to initiate and pursue weak claims of
securities fraud until they extract a settlement offer from defendants,'87
IV. INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS' STAKES
IN CLASS ACTIONS
Most critiques of class actions assume that substantial agency costs are
unavoidable because no class member has a stake in the litigation large enough
to justify monitoring the attorneys who represent the class.' This
assumption underlies Professors Macey and Miller's proposal that courts
dispense with plaintiffs in class actions and simply auction off claims to the
attorney willing to pay the most for them,'89 as well as Judge Walker's
decision to auction off the lead counsel position in Oracle.' Similarly, the
Third Circuit recently observed that "[g]enerally, the costs of monitoring will
exceed the pro rata benefit to any single shareholder even though they may be
lower than the benefits to all."'1t
We began our research suspecting that institutional investors account for
a substantial portion of the interests represented by plaintiffs' counsel in most
class actions.' 92 Data on institutions' stock holdings and share of trading
fueled these suspicions. In addition, Professor Alexander had noted that in one
class action involving an initial public offering, the top ten claimants accounted
for 23.5% of total approved claims of $11.7 million, the top five accounted for
16%, and the highest claim was for a loss of $1.7 million. 93 In another such
action, the top five claimants accounted for 32.7% of $33 million in claimed
losses and the top 1% of claimants (twenty-three claims) accounted for 54%
187. Cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1311 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
("Rewarding the filing and prosecution of large, complex lawsuits with poor prospects for success arguably
risks fueling the growth of 'nuisance' or 'strike' litigation, in which settlement becomes the main object
and attorney fee awards an overpowering motivating force."), rev'd in part on other grounds and aff'd in
part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987).
188. Coffee, Economic Theory, supra note 16, at 677-78; Coffee, Regulation, supra note 16, at
894-95 ("Mhe plaintiff with the largest expected recovery may still have an inadequate incentive to
monitor .... ); Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 20 ("[The small size of the individual claims creates
enormous free-rider effects: no rational plaintiff would take on the role of litigation monitor because she
would incur all the costs of doing so but would realize only her pro rata share of the benefits.").
189. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 108.
190. Judge Walker was attempting to replicate the fee arrangement that a knowledgeable client would
have negotiated. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692-93 (N.D. Cal. 1990). It would seem to
follow that, had the court believed the class included a knowledgeable investor with a suitably large stake
in the litigation, the court's preference would have been to involve that class member in the fee negotiation.
191. Bell Ad. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993). Bell Atlantic was a derivative
action, but the authority the court cited on this point largely relates to class actions. See also Eisenberg v.
Gagnon, 766 F2d 770, 785 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d
291, 296 (2d Cir. 1968) (explaining that in typical class action, "no one person may have been damaged
to a degree which would have induced him to institute litigation solely on his own behalf"), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 977 (1969); Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 374 (D. Del. 1990).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
193. Alexander, supra note 16, at 575.
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of claimed losses.' 9" A comment in The Wall Street Journal concerning class
actions reported that in one such case, five institutional claimants, out of a total
of 302 claimants, accounted for 36% of claimed losses; in a second case, 1%
of 4952 claimants accounted for 52% of claimed losses; and in a third, one
claimant of 1531 accounted for more than 16% of claimed losses.'"
We analyzed data that Gilardi & Co., a leading claims administrator, had
submitted to the Senate Securities Subcommittee and developed a more
comprehensive picture of the extent of the stakes institutional investors and
other large claimants have in class actions.'9 We found that the fifty largest
claimants in eighty-two actions accounted for a median of 57.8% and an
average of 57.5% of all allowed losses, even though they represented only a
median of 1.7% and an average of 3.5% of all claims filed." The fifty
largest claimants' average loss was $597,000 in the eighty-two actions for
which all necessary data were reported; their median loss was $267,927. In
fifteen of those actions, the fifty largest claimants' average allowed loss
exceeded $1 million. Moreover, these figures appeared to understate the size
of large claimants' stakes because Gilardi treats as separate claims all claims
filed by associated institutions, such as mutual funds under common
management or pension funds split between different managers. ' "
We then analyzed claims reports for twenty settled class actions as
summarized in Table 2. These reports further document that institutional
investors account for almost all the largest claims made in class actions and
that some institutions have very large amounts at stake in most such actions.
They also suggest that class members recover low percentages of their
recognized losses in class actions,'99 which makes it likely that the
institutions with the largest amounts at stake might well be able to generate
substantial net benefits by acting as litigation monitors.
194. Id. at 576.
195. Vincent E. O'Brien, The Class-Action Shakedown Racket, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10. 1991. at A20;
see also Vincent E. O'Brien & Richard W. Hodges. A Study of Class Action Securities Fraud Cases
1988-1993, at 111-3 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (reporting that in five securities
class actions, top five claims accounted for average of 25% of all allowed claims, top 10 accounted for
34.49%, and top 1% (an average of 31 claims) accounted for 39.60%).
196. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 783-92. The data were provided by Gilardi & Co. Incomplete
data were provided on a number of other class actions.
197. The institutional investors among the top 50 claimants (the number of wtuch was not supplied)
accounted for a median of 45.4% and an average of 45.9% of all allowed losses. Id.
198. This statement is based on our examination of settlement distribution reports we received from
Gilardi & Co. See infra note 200.
199. Data on the extent to which class actions compensate investors for their losses are subject to
considerable interpretation. We assume that the parties who settle class actions define "allowed losses" as
equivalent to investors' losses caused by defendants' alleged frauds. But that is not necessarily so. Allowed
losses might reflect investors' market losses in the securities in question, which generally will be much
larger than their losses attributable to defendants' frauds. Compare Senate Hearings. supra note 2- at 75.
77 (testimony of Edward I. Radetich that recoveries average 13.5455% of investors' losses) with u at 141.
143 (testimony of William S. Lerach that "claimants receive about 60 percent of their recoverable
damages").
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Corporate Total Ten Largest Largest Second Percent of
Defendant Recognized Claimants Claimant Largest Recognized
Losses (% of total) (% of total) Claimant Losses
(% of total) Recovered
Altos $12,200,484 $9,806,588 $4,151,241 $1,824,532 19.7%
Computer (80.4%) (34.0%) (15.0%)
American $89,809,874 $12,361,759 $3,995,210 $2,472,628 N.A.
Continental (13.8%) (4A%) (2.8%)
Am re $45,197,866 $27,674,518 $11,507,506 $5,349,022 24.5%
(61.2%) (25.5%) (11.8%)
Avon Products $39,554,879 $15,351,069 $3,077,816 $2,806,815 10.8%
(38.8%) (7.8%) (7.1%)
Cetus $78,326,437 $25,618,609 $7,430,658 $4,355,625 10.1%
(32.7%) (9.5%) (5.6%)
Columbia $127,876,063 $46,085,801 $14,070,068 $12,008,274 N.A.
S&L (36.0%) (11.0%) (9.4%)
Daisy Systems $46,317,178 $18,391,867 $8,565,645 $2,252,970 N.A.
(39.7%) (18.5%) (4.9%)
DeLaurentiis $30,776,512 $11,437,466 $2,772,693 $1,665,936 N.A.
(37.2%) (9.0%) (5.4%)
Fidelity $6,707,789 $1,900,932 $463,105 $430,396 23.2%
Financial (28.3%) (6.9%) (6.4%o)
Floating Point $55,776,823 $21,808,307 $4,654,111 $2,931,517 15.3%
(39.1%) (8.3%) (5.3%)
Newport $16,810,872 $5,183,897 $1,421,071 $814,510 23.6%
Pharmaceutical (30.8%) (8.5%) (4.8%)
Odetics $1,473,690 $791,360 $479,900 $131,685 N.A.
(53.7%) (32.6%) (8.9%)
Pyramid $8,625,369 $5,191,557 $728,410 $716,928 24.9%
Technology (60.2%) (8.4%) (8.3%)
Qintex $19,591,108 $3,806,643 $615,080 $506,032 14.2%
(19.4%) (3.1%) (2.6%)
Rykoff-Sexton $26,100,286 $11,641,214 $5,670,994 $1,069,353 22.0%
(44.6%) (21.7%) (4.1%)
Symbol $84,178,415 $35,215,275 $13,620,518 $4,884,592 11.4%
Technology (41.8%) (16.2%) (5.8%)
Todd $55,209,505 $23,947,446 $3,892,640 $3,390,641 17.5%
Shipyards (43.4%) (7.1%) (6.1%)
Vidmark $6,288,956 $2,132,382 $450,000 $363,630 41.7%
(33.9%) (7.2%) (5.8%)
VLSI $7,230,678 $3,477,430 $1,047,833 $614,643 N.A.
Technology (48.1%) (14.5%) (8.5%)
Western $7,517,880 $1,989,909 $626,374 $338,492 13.0%
Health Plans (26.5%) (8.3%) (4.5%)
Mean (%) - 40.5% 13.1% 6.7%
Median (%) 39.0% 8.8% 5.8%
TABLE 2. Large Claimants' Share of Losses' 2
200. Two law firms provided us with the settlement reports for a total of the five most recent class
action settlements they had administered. A third law firm provided us with reports for 15 class actions that
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All but twenty-six of the claimants who filed the ten largest claims in
these cases and all but four of the claimants who filed the two largest claims
appear to be institutional investors. °'' These institutional claimants include
mutual fund groups, bank trust departments, insurance companies, professional
money managers, and pension funds. 2  Only ten of the claimants who filed
the ten largest claims appear to have been foreign entities. One of these foreign
claimants filed the largest claim in the Avon Products litigation and three were
among the ten largest claimants in Western Health Plans.
The percentages in Table 2 probably overstate large claimants' stakes as
a percentage of the losses suffered by class members; not all class members
file claims. Investors with small claims no doubt file less often, because at
some point the costs involved in filing a proof of claim will exceed the amount
an investor is likely to recover. In contrast, it seems likely that institutional
investors with sizable losses almost always file. 3 In any event, it is the
absolute size of institutions' claims that we find significant. Those losses
define what institutions have at stake in class actions.
We also gathered data from the State of Wisconsin Investment Board
(SWIB), the California Public Employees Retirement System (CaIPERS), the
State of New Jersey pension fund, a large private pension fund, and a large
mutual fund group that further confirm that institutional investors often have
large stakes in class actions. For each of these institutions, where the data were
it had settled in recent years. While these reports do not constitute a random sample, we have no reason
to believe they are not representative. The data in them are consistent with the data for the larger universe
of settlements included in the Senate Hearings, supra note 2; see supra text accompanying notes 196-98.
In addition, when we requested these reports, we did not inform the law firms involved of the focus of our
inquiry.
Our examination of these settlement reports made clear that several associated or affiliated investors
often file claims in the same class action-for example, several mutual funds or pension funds managed
by the same advisor. We treat as single claims all claims that. based on data such as common names and
addresses, we concluded had been submitted by entities under common management.
The reports for three actions included the total amount paid to class members, which we used to
compute "Percent of Recognized Losses Recovered." For the others, we looked first to the Senate Hearings.
supra note 2, at 263-64. 784-92, for data on total claims paid in the named class actions. If such data were
not included in the Hearings, we next reviewed judicial decisions approving settlements of class actions
against the companies in question. Where no such decision was reported. we reviewed The Wall Street
Journal and the NEXIS News/Cumws. News/Arcnws. and Compny/Allnws files for reports of settlements.
Where such reports included the amount of the settlement, but no statement or estimate of attorneys' fees
and costs, we assumed that 75% of the settlement fund was paid to the class.
201. Individuals filed the largest claim in Fidelity Financial and the second largest claims in Columbia
S&L, Qintex, and Vidmark. Individuals filed three of the ten largest claims in American Continental. seven
of the ten largest in Fidelity Financial, and six of the ten largest in Qintex.
202. Most of these reports were made available to us on the condition that we not identify claimants.
so as to preserve their privacy.
203. No reliable estimates of the extent of nonfiling are available. Janet Cooper Alexander. The Value
of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L REv. 1421. 1449 (1994). reviews studies that seem
to indicate that "perhaps 40% or more [of eligible shares] do not file claims." Alexander later notes.
however, that the proportional trading model that plaintiffs' damage experts use, which provides the basis
for these estimates, "systematically overstates damages by assuming that all shares are equally likely to
trade .... [Thus, t]hese studies ... understate the effectiveness of securities litigation." Id. at 1463.
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supplied, 204 we computed total recoveries from class actions for each year,
the two largest recoveries, and all other recoveries in excess of $200,000. 05
We also calculated the percentage of total recoveries in the relevant actions
that these recoveries represented.2" We report below, for each of these
institutions, total annual recoveries, data concerning the two largest recoveries,
and data concerning additional large recoveries that represented in excess of
five percent of the total recovered by the plaintiff class.
SWIB recovered $5,625,386 from class actions in fiscal 1994. Its two
largest recoveries, $1,712,795 from a suit against C.R. Bard' 7 and
$1,160,639 from a suit against Rykoff-Sexton, represented 13.7% and 20.2%,
respectively, of the totals paid to the plaintiff class in those actions. SWIB had
recoveries in excess of $200,000 from five other class actions during this
period. The $305,186 it recovered from a suit against TCBY represented
15.1% of the total paid to the class in that action,
CalPERS recovered $3,104,956 from class actions in 1993 and $2,775,434
in the first nine months of 1994. Its two largest recoveries during this period,
$1,445,321 from a suit against RJR-Nabisco and $828,592 from a suit against
Tenneco, represented 2.7% and 2.2%, respectively, of the totals paid to the
plaintiff class in those actions. CalPERS had recoveries in excess of $200,000
from seven other class actions during this period. The $245,444 it recovered
from a suit against Micropolis represented 14.2% of the total paid to the class
in that action; the $467,840 it recovered from a suit against Digital
Communications represented 10.0% of the total paid to the class in that action;
and the $795,578 it recovered from a suit against Raychem represented 6.2%
of the total paid to the class in that action.
The New Jersey pension fund recovered $2,059,636 in 1991, $563,640 in
1992, and $322,065 in 1993 from class actions. Its two largest recoveries
during this period, $810,358 from a suit against Bergen Brunswig and
$749,167 from a suit against Continental Illinois, represented 27.0% and 1.9%,
respectively, of the totals paid to the plaintiff class in those actions. The New
Jersey fund had recoveries in excess of $200,000 from four other class actions
during this period. The $535,215 it recovered from a suit against Lymphomed
represented 5.6% of the total paid to the plaintiff class in that action.
204. All but the mutual fund group provided details of all recoveries in one or more recent years,
205. Estimates vary widely as to the extent to which recoveries in class actions compensate class
members for their compensable losses. We treat as potentially significant all recoveries in excess of
$200,000 because we view that figure as a reasonable proxy for cases in which an institutional investor's
arguably compensable losses exceed $1 million.
206. We used the same method to compute the totals paid to class members as we did to compute the
percentage of recognized loss recovered in Table 2. See supra note 200.
207. We use the name of the corporation involved to identify all class actions discussed in this Part.
However, other defendants probably were named in these actions and they or their insurers may have
contributed toward these settlements.
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The large private pension fund recovered $3,659,821 from class actions
through September 19, 1994, $4,307,223 in 1993, and $2,872,204 in 1992. Its
two largest recoveries, $1,525,167 from a suit against Whittaker and $811,434
for a suit against MGM/UA, represented 14.3% and 3.1%, respectively, of the
totals paid to the plaintiff class in those actions.m The fund had recoveries
in excess of $200,000 from eleven other class actions during this period. The
$602,600 the fund recovered from a suit against On-Line Software represented
19.6% of the total paid to the plaintiff class in that action; the $236,514 it
recovered from a suit against FHP International represented 6.1% of the total
paid to the plaintiff class in that action.
The mutual fund group recovered $18.3 million in 1993.' 09 Its two
largest recoveries, $2.1 million from a suit against Tenneco and $1.7 million
from a suit against Chiquita Brands, represented 5.6% and 22.7%, respectively,
of the totals paid to the plaintiff class in those actions.
Finally, we analyzed the data Gilardi & Co. supplied to the Senate
Securities Subcommittee and the claims distribution reports to determine what
share of settlements goes to what one might call "average individual
investors," who often are said to be the principal beneficiaries of securities
class actions.21 We found that they receive a very minor share of the sums
paid to investors as a consequence of such suits. From the Gilardi & Co. data
for eighty-two cases, we computed that all claimants other than those who filed
the fifty largest claims had median losses of $590 and average losses of
$868.211
We then used claims distribution reports for fourteen settlements 22 to
compute the percentage of valid claims filed and the percentage of losses
claimed by investors with allowable losses of less than or equal to $1000 and
less than or equal to $5000.2t3
208. The fund also recovered $1,197,078 from a suit involving the acquisition of \agon-Lits N.V.
that was decided by a Belgian court See Accor Shares Lower in Paris as lWagon-Lits Takeover Cost Rues.
AFX News, June 24, 1994, available in LEXIS. World Library. Extafx File (conversion from Belgian
francs by authors). We included this recovery in the funds' total recoveries during 1994.
209. Telephone Interview with associate general counsel, fund group (Oct. 3. 1994).
210. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577 (9th Cir. 1990) (Congress intends
through securities laws "'to protect the public, particularly unsophisticated investors- (quoting Paul F.
Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980))), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
976 (1991); Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo. 55 FRD. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Rule 23
"intended to benefit the small consumer or investor who otherwise would have no means of redress-);
Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 141 (prepared statement of William S. Lerach) ("victims of fraud" are
"[tiens of thousands of people, many of them retirees").
211. This calculation excludes the Lincoln Savings litigation, which involved few institutional
claimants. If it is included, the mean recovery of claimants other than the top 50 is S95 1.
212. Six other settlement reports did not contain data that allowed us to extract easily information
about claims of modest size.
213. The "less than $5000" category includes investors with losses of less than S1000.
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Corporate Claims Claims Claims Claims
Defendant <$1000 -<$1000 (% of _5$5000 (% of .'$5000 (% of
(% of Total Total Allowed Total Valid Total Allowed
Valid Claims) Losses) Claims) Losses)
Altos Computer 48.41 .89 77.80 3.59
American 4.37 .29 61.38 18.71
Continental
Cetus 42.81 1.73 81.22 9.29
Columbia S&L 19.30 .60 66.64 7.36
Daisy Systems 23.14 .54 68.02 4.36
DeLaurentiis 16.90 .67 61.92 10.46
Fidelity 42.51 3.39 80.46 18.33
Financial
Newport 37.87 2.67 78.75 15.22
Pharmaceutical
Pyramid 35.36 .40 62.36 2.29
Technology
Qintex 37.73 2.65 76.50 15.79
Rykoff-Sexton 20.93 .52 62.20 5.40
Vidmark 23.49 1.41 71.39 16.79
VLSI 42.67 2.37 83.17 13.25
Technology
Western Health 23.54 1.79 74.24 18.47
Mean 29.93 1.42 71.86 11.38
Median 29.45 1.15 72.82 [ 1.86
TABLE 3. Small Claimants' Share of Claims and Losses
If one makes the reasonable assumption that investors' "allowable losses"
average roughly ten percent of the amounts they paid for securities, allowable
losses of $1000 and $5000 correspond to individual investments of roughly
$10,000 and $50,000, respectively. The latter figure strikes us as more than
what most people assume the "average individual investor" typically invests
in a given security. But even if one treats all claims up to $5000 as having
been made by "average individual investors," it is apparent that such investors
receive only a very minor share of the amounts recovered in securities class
actions.
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V. How PROCEDURAL RULES AND PRACTICES DETER MONITORING
Institutional investors with large stakes in class actions surely are more
capable than typical figurehead plaintiffs of effectively monitoring how
plaintiffs' attorneys conduct such litigation. Institutions' large stakes give them
an incentive to monitor, and institutions have or readily could develop the
expertise necessary to assess whether plaintiffs' attorneys are acting as faithful
champions for the plaintiff class. Until very recently,2t4 however, institutions
have not sought to play that monitoring role. They have sat on the sidelines,
allowed plaintiffs' attorneys to proceed as they see fit, and become involved
in class actions only to the extent of filling out proof-of-claim forms once
settlements are negotiated and approved.1 5
Institutions' passivity does not signal that institutions always are pleased
with the job plaintiffs' attorneys do. Representatives of institutional investors
with whom we spoke reflected a variety of attitudes. Most saw class actions
and the associated threat of liability as an important component of the
mandatory disclosure system. Some noted that institutions, as large
shareholders with diversified portfolios, bear most of the costs of class action
litigation as well as reap most of the benefits. Several voiced suspicions about
plaintiffs' attorneys' motivations and questioned the terms on which some class
actions have been settled. Maryellen F. Andersen, Treasurer of the Council of
Institutional Investors, recently expressed similar sentiments to the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. She noted that institutions
"are the ones who are hurt if the system does not work right, or effectively,
or efficiently, and we are the ones who stand to benefit when it does. 2 6 She
added: "[T]here is reason to believe the [class action litigation] system is not
yet working right.
217
214. See infra note 273.
215. This is how lawyers representing a range of institutions have described to us the roles that those
institutions typically play in class actions. The principal exception is that some mutual funds monitor the
progress of class actions more closely so that they can (a) review the adequacy of proposed settlements and
(b) take account of expected recoveries from pending class actions, as appropriate, when computing their
net asset value.
An attorney who has monitored and participated in securities litigation for several institutional
investors confirmed to us that institutions most often have gotten involved as plaintiffs, either prosecuting
their own claims or suing on behalf of a class, in suits involving purchases of debt securities, which often
are sold to only a small number of investors. He also stated that on a few occasions, institutions that were
pursuing claims on their own behalf against issuers have recovered a portion of their attorneys' fees from
class action settlement funds created in actions against the same issuers, where the institutions have worked
closely with class plaintiff's counsel and have provided substantial assistance to class counsel. Finally. the
attorney noted that it normally will not make economic sense for an institution (or institutions) to initiate
direct claims against an issuer unless it (or they) has claims of at least S10 million. Telephone Interviews
with confidential source (Oct. 4-5, 1994).
216. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 323 (testimony of Maryellen F. Andersen).
217. Id. Ms. Andersen also testified that institutions are unsure of the nature or dimensions of
problems with class action litigation. Id. at 324.
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We do not believe that institutional investors have been passive because
they have been concerned about having to pay large fees to plaintiffs'
attorneys. Many attorneys who now represent plaintiffs in class actions, and
probably other attorneys as well, presumably would be as prepared to litigate
class actions on a contingent fee basis for institutional investor clients as they
have been to represent figurehead plaintiffs.218  Moreover, from an
institutional investor's point of view, the most advantageous position in which
to monitor a class action is that of "lead plaintiff," by which we mean the
named plaintiff whose attorney serves as lead counsel and thus controls how
the action will be prosecuted. As lead plaintiff, an institution would bear no
larger share of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees than it would as a passive member of
the plaintiff class, but it would be far better situated to monitor and influence
lead counsel's conduct. An institution that preferred to participate secondarily,
by intervening in the action or objecting to a settlement once it was reached,
would have less influence over plaintiffs' attorneys and would probably have
to pay both its own attorneys' fees and its share of any fees awarded to the
attorneys who represent the class.
21 9
218. Attorneys who now find it worthwhile to represent nominal plaintiffs in class actions on a
contingent fee basis should find it attractive to represent institutional investors on a similar basis unless they
generate a substantial portion of their income through opportunistic behavior. While substantial agency costs
appear to be associated with class actions as currently prosecuted, see supra parts H-I1, it also is clear that
many plaintiffs' attorneys are reputable lawyers who generate income from class actions largely through
skillful representation of investors' interests. Some of those lawyers might prefer to represent institutional
investor clients, particularly if by doing so they could avoid having to participate in the current "race to
the courthouse." Richard Dannenberg, senior partner at Lowey Dannenberg Bemporad & Selinger, notes:
The real perceived abuse that needs to be remedied is the immediate multiple filing of
actions with the purpose of seeking to be appointed lead counsel.... Were the courts to
establish criteria for the appointment of lead counsel, which exclude the consideration of the
first to file, most, if not all, of the perceived abuses would disappear.
Letter from Richard B. Dannenberg to Arthur Levitt, supra note 66, at 3 n.3.
In addition, some firms that now represent clients largely on a fee-for-service basis and thus have not
represented plaintiffs in class actions might find it attractive to represent institutional investor plaintiffs in
class actions on a contingent fee basis. After all, as established a firm as Cravath, Swaine & Moore elected
to represent the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Resolution Trust Corporation partly on a
contingent fee basis. Marianne Lavelle, FDIC Legal Program Criticized, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 3;
Scot J. Paltrow, FDIC Seeks $6.8-Billion Damages from Drexel, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1990, at Al, A19;
see also Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 323-28 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing circumstances in which
contingency fee arrangement is more rational for clients and lawyers).
On the other hand, some firms that now represent class action plaintiffs might face substantial
conflict-of-interest issues were they to seek to represent institutional investors, many of which are part of
multiservice financial organizations that those attorneys have sued. In addition, some plaintiffs' attorneys
may prefer to represent figurehead plaintiffs, who are not likely to pose any conflict problems and are not
likely to have sufficient financial interest in the litigation to want to monitor or to have the knowledge or
ability to do so. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Lawyers and Clients: Irate Investors Keep Sharp Eye on Attorneys
in Smith Barney Suit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1994, at B8 (describing how committee of well-educated,
affluent investors has been monitoring securities class action and noting that plaintiffs' lawyers refer to
committee as "the Committee from Hell").
219. While FED. R. CiV. P. 23(c)(2)(C) permits non-opt-outs to appear through counsel, it is almost
unheard of for absentee class members to appear through counsel other than to object to a proposed
settlement or award of attorneys' fees. Intervenors not serving in any representative capacity ar "entitled
to no fee out of any fund obtained by the class members except to the extent that their work benefits the
class as a whole." County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407, 1422 (E.D.N.Y.
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It seems much more likely that institutions' passivity is attributable, to a
substantial degree, to obstacles that arise as a consequence of the procedures
courts employ in class action litigation. The significance of those obstacles can
best be appreciated if one first understands the procedural steps confronting
class action plaintiffs.
A. Procedures Applicable to Class Action Plaintiffs
A class action begins when one or more attorneys file complaints on
behalf of named plaintiffs who purport to sue on behalf of a class of
investors.2 -° If more than one complaint relating to the same transaction or
event is filed, all such complaints generally are transferred to one district, if
necessary, and consolidated in a single action.
The judge to whom the case is assigned uses status conferences to
organize pretrial proceedings. If several plaintiffs' lawyers are contending for
the position of lead counsel for the class, the court typically designates or
announces a procedure for designating lead counsel. The court also sets a
discovery schedule.
Discovery usually follows rapidly on the filing of a class action complaint.
Defendants seek evidence to rebut plaintiffs' assertions that they have met Rule
23's requirements for maintaining a class action. In particular, defendants seek
ammunition (also relevant to the merits) that putative representative plaintiffs
are subject to unique defenses that make them atypical class members, or
cannot adequately represent the class because their interests conflict with those
of the class. Rule 23(c)(1) also requires the court, "[a]s soon as practicable"
after a class action is commenced,"' to determine whether the suit can be
maintained as a class action. The Rule also requires notice of the pendency of
the action to be provided to all class members.m
1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990). Intervenors' claims, even if large. rarely are large enough to
justify payment of attorneys' fees at ordinary hourly rates.
220. These allegations assert that plaintiff is suing on behalf of a defined class of similarly situated
persons, for example, all persons who purchased stock in ABC Corporation between x date and y date,
excluding any defendant or member of any defendant's family.
Lawsuits that include claims for violations of the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
must be brought in U.S. District Courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. Lawsuits for
violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (but not of the Securities Exchange Act) may be brought in either
federal or state courts, which have concurrent jurisdiction. Claims under state law may be filed in either
state or federal courts.
221. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides in relevant pan: "As soon as practicable after the
commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to
be so maintained." In fact, "[als soon as practicable" may be several years.
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3). the court shall direct to the members
of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual nouce to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests
by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not. will include all members who
do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if the
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Defendants' and plaintiffs' attorneys agree to settle virtually all class
actions that survive motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.
Counsel for the parties then ask the court to approve the settlement
provisionally. If it does, the court sets a date for a settlement hearing and
orders that notice be sent informing class members of the basic terms of the
settlement, their right to object, and procedures for doing so.
At the settlement hearing, the court, after reviewing any objections, usually
approves the proposed settlement as fair and adequate. It then passes on
plaintiffs' attorneys' application for fees and reimbursement of expenses. All
fees and expenses awarded are paid off the top of the settlement fund. The
remainder of the fund then is distributed, in accordance with procedures agreed
upon in the stipulation of settlement, to class members who have filed valid
claims.
B. Procedural Obstacles to Institutions Becoming Named Plaintiffs
The practices courts employ to select lead counsel for the class, to provide
notice to class members, and to determine whether putative plaintiffs are
adequate class representatives with typical claims produce the three principal
procedural obstacles to institutional investors becoming lead plaintiffs in class
actions.
1. Procedures for Appointment of Lead Counsel
The processes courts use to designate lead counsel create the most
significant obstacle. As discussed above, courts generally appoint as lead
counsel either the lawyer who files the first complaint or a lawyer elected by
all the lawyers who have filed complaints.rn
Lawyers representing institutional investors are unlikely to win the "race
to the courthouse" or even to be among the early filers. Regardless of whether
an institution becomes aware of a potential claim on its own or is made aware
of that claim by a plaintiffs' attorney, the institution presumably will want to
evaluate carefully whether the potential claim has merit before deciding
whether to file suit. An institution that proceeds in such a deliberative fashion,
however, will face a steeply uphill battle if it decides that the case is strong
enough, and its stake is large enough, to justify an effort to become lead
plaintiff.
Despite authority that where more than one complaint is filed in a class
action, the court should select as plaintiffs' lead counsel the lawyer who will
member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
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best represent the interests of the class,'" courts virtually never consider the
possibility that one aspiring lead plaintiff is more likely than another to
monitor her lawyer's conduct of the litigation. In fact, courts often state that
a lead plaintiff need not be the best available class representative,' but
merely one who is likely to pursue the case in the interests of the class. 1
6
Courts require nothing more by way of proof of adequacy than that an aspiring
plaintiff have sustained losses akin to those incurred by other class members,
be represented by competent counsel, and have no interest antagonistic to the
interests of the class. 7 In essence, courts erroneously equate adequacy of
representation with constitutional standing and assume that no potential
lead plaintiff is capable of contributing any more than her willingness to be
named.229
An institutional investor inclined to monitor a class action actively who
has not participated in the race to the courthouse thus is unlikely to secure the
appointment as lead counsel of the lawyers it believes will most faithfully and
diligently represent its interests and those of the plaintiff class. Similarly,
plaintiffs' attorneys who become aware of a potential class action claim have
224. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Utig.. 818 F.2d 179. 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (court's selection
of lead counsel should be guided by best interests of class). cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); Summit
Office Park v. United States Steel Corp., 639 F.2d 1278. 1287 (5th Cir. 1981) (Wisdom. J.. dissenting)
("[I]f a district court finds it advisable to appoint lead counsel, the selection should not be based on who
filed suit first, but on the ability of the counsel to represent the class.").
225. See Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., 103 F.R.D. 562, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Wolfson v. Riley,
94 F.RD. 243, 245 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Apanewicz v. General Motors Corp.. 80 F.R.D. 672. 677 (leD. Pa.
1978); 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er At., FEDERAL PRAC'nCE & PROCEDURE § 1765 (1986 & Supp. 1994)
(citing cases).
226. They reason that if class members think the chosen representative inadequate, they are free to
opt out. See Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., (1996-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
1 93,068, at 95,324-26 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 22, 1986). In cases with a large volume of small claims, opting
out is hardly a rational economic choice, since the small size of an opt-out's claim would by definition not
warrant independent litigation.
227. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir.) (plaintiff adequately represented class where
plaintiff's attorney was qualified and plaintiff did not have interests antagonistic to class). cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1982); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 (7th Cir. 1977) (trial court did not abuse
discretion in finding that plaintiffs did not adequately represent class because of potential conflict of interest
arising from relationship between plaintiffs and counsel).
228. Constitutional standing and fairness and adequacy of representation, while related in that both
deal with the propriety of a person's asserting claims in litigation, are distinguishable. The standing inquiry
asks whether one can assert a claim for oneself; the adequacy inquiry should ask whether one is the proper
person to assert a claim on behalf of others. Hassine v. Jeffes. 846 F.2d 169, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1988). The
fact that plaintiffs themselves have standing to sue because they suffered injury or incurred loss should not
automatically render them adequate representatives of the interests of other persons who are not before the
court. Cosgrove v. Bowen, No. 85 Civ. 4472. 1988 WL 253323. at * I (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1. 1988) (substantial
difference between standing to sue and propriety, similarities, and adequacy of representation); I HERBERT
B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.09 (2d ed. 1985).
229. See, e.g., In re Adobe Sys.. Inc. Sec. Litig.. 139 F.R.D. 150, 156 (N.D. Cal. 1991):
The reality of complex cases of this type is that clients must defer a great amount of discretion
to their lawyers.... mhe test for adequacy of representation is merely whether or not plaintiffs
have demonstrated a willingness and vigor to prosecute the action, whether they have any
disabling conflicts going to the heart of the controversy, and whether they have qualified
counsel.
The Yale Law Journal
no incentive to seek out an institutional investor as a client rather than file suit
in the name of a figurehead plaintiff."0
2. Lack of Timely Notice
Lack of notice of the pendency and details of securities class actions
complicates institutional investors' problems. As noted, plaintiffs' lawyers have
no incentive to inform institutional investors of potential securities law claims
with a view to enlisting them as clients. Neither are institutions likely to learn
of such suits from corporate defendants. A corporation has no obligation to
issue a press release disclosing that it has been sued unless the suit is likely
to have a material effect on the corporation's financial condition. Moreover,
corporations generally are averse to publicizing class actions,23' perhaps
fearing that doing so will stimulate the filing of additional claims.
Despite Rule 23's requirements, class members rarely receive notice of the
pendency of a class action soon after the action is filed. In many cases, the
parties agree, with the court's concurrence, to defer for months or even years
the resolution of class certification issues. The parties may be concerned about
the costs of notice, which can be substantial. Plaintiffs (or their counsel)
initially are responsible for those costs, but defendants eventually bear them
whenever a class action suit is settled. 2 Consequently, the parties may
attempt first to resolve whether plaintiffs' complaint states a claim on which
relief can be granted or whether it does so with the specificity Rule 9(b)
requires. If the complaint survives a motion to dismiss, the parties may decide
to proceed with discovery and attempt to negotiate a settlement. Then they can
reduce litigation-related costs by sending a single notice informing class
members of the pendency of the class action, the settlement, the hearing on the
fairness of the settlement, and class members' rights to object to or share in
the settlement or to opt out of the plaintiff class.233
Lack of timely notice makes it difficult for institutional investors to
participate in class actions. An institution may be aware that it has sustained
a large loss in the value of a particular security, and may even be able to link
that loss to some public disclosure. But institutional investors do not have the
expertise of plaintiffs' lawyers to perceive whether a claim of securities fraud
230. Absent incentives, plaintiffs' attorneys may prefer the freedom from monitoring that they enjoy
when representing figurehead plaintiffs. See Jacobs, supra note 218, at B8.
231. WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EiSENBERG, CORPORATIONS 1087 (6th ed. 1988).
232. In settled cases, defendants agree to pay the cost of notice either directly or indirectly through
the settlement fund.
233. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 231, at 1086-87; see also D&B Notice, supra note 115 (class
certified on September 22, 1992; "Notice of Pendency of Action, Class Action Determination, Proposed
Settlement, Settlement Hearing, and Right to Share in Settlement or to Request Exclusion" sent during
August 1993, following execution of stipulation of settlement at end of June).
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is likely to lie, or those lawyers' incentive to devote substantial resources to
investigating potential claims.23
Thus, as the general counsel of one large institution makes clear, lack of
notice hinders institutional participation in class actions: "We are often the
largest shareholder of the plaintiff 'class.' Yet, seldom do we get much detail
about the claims filed or progress of settlement discussions until a deal has
already been struck." 5
3. Discovery Concerning Typicality and Adequacy
To maintain a class action, a named plaintiff must be able to represent the
class adequately and must have claims typical of the class. In part, this means
that courts will refuse to certify purported classes if named plaintiffs are
subject to unique defenses. Such plaintiffs' claims are deemed to be atypical,
which renders the plaintiffs unsuitable to represent a class.
Adequacy and typicality requirements are designed to safeguard the
interests of absentee class members, but courts generally assume that absentees
probably will not appear to challenge the credentials of putative named
plaintiffs. Consequently, courts permit defendants, as the best available
surrogates, to mount such challenges. Defendants, however, are not interested
in ensuring that class members are represented adequately by a named plaintiff
with claims typical of the class, but in preventing class members from being
represented by any named plaintiff at all.236 Consequently, defendants use the
threat of discovery to deter plaintiffs from coming forward and discovery itself
to develop information that will convince a court to deny plaintiffs' request for
class certification.
Rarely if ever, though, will discovery about typicality be relevant to class
certification issues, at least in FOM suits. All members of purported plaintiff
classes in such suits have the same interest in establishing that defendants
made material misstatements and acted with scienter. Under the presumption
of reliance established by Basic, all class members will be presumed to have
234. Nor does the financial press adequately inform institutional investors about class actions. Not all
filings are reported, and press reports typically do not include details about the particulars of the claims
asserted or the alleged class period.
235. Letter from Kurt N. Schacht, General Counsel. SWIB, to Sen. Pete V. Dominici 2 (Sept. 27.
1993) (on file with authors). Although we have focused on the possibility that institutions would find it
beneficial to act as class representatives, it is also possible that an institutional investor falling within the
class definition of a purported class action complaint would oppose the bringing of the class action. In such
circumstances, early notice of the pendency of class actions would permit large investors who opposed
particular class actions to take action to discourage their maintenance or to assist in their defensc. See. e.g.,
Karen Donovan, Pension Managers Speaking Up. NAT'L L., Mar. 13. 1995, at A6--A7; Mark Walsh, Big
Investors Speaking Out on Securities Suits, RECORDER. Feb. 23, 1995. at 3 (describing how CaIPERS and
three other pension funds wrote letter urging dismissal of suits against Intel Corp. following disclosure of
flaws in Pentium chip). It is not clear whether such an investor would have standing to appear or intervene
in the action.
236. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 63-66.
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purchased or sold a security in the belief that its market price reflected all
publicly available information, unless the defendant demonstrates that a class
member acted on the basis of material inside information or purchased the
security for reasons unrelated to its merit as an investment.237 Investors who
trade in violation of the prohibition against insider trading are not likely to
subject themselves to scrutiny by becoming class action plaintiffs. Rational
investors do not purchase securities at prices they believe are inflated by fraud,
nor do they sell securities at prices they believe are depressed by fraud. Thus,
a defendant is likely to be able to rebut the presumption of reliance only where
someone has purchased securities with a view to becoming a class action
plaintiff.
While a motion for class certification is not an appropriate point at which
to litigate the merits of plaintiff's claim,' 8 defendants can question whether
an aspiring representative plaintiff is atypical because she is subject to, and is
likely to be preoccupied with, defenses unique to her.239 In re Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. Securities Litigation,A0 for example, upheld requests
that two named plaintiffs produce the complaint and the transcript of any
deposition given in any other securities class action or corporate derivative
litigation to which either had been a party, as well as brokerage statements for
all their securities trading activities during a two-year period. Other courts have
upheld similar requests.24
Although these rulings may be reasonable in cases where defendants have
some basis for alleging that a repeat plaintiff purchased stock in a troubled
company, without regard to price, for the purpose of qualifying as a
representative plaintiff,12 they are troublesome to the extent that they open
237. See supra text accompanying notes 122-28; see also Hoexter v. Simmons, 140 F.R.D. 416,
419-20 (D. Ariz. 1991) (rejecting defendants' contention that named plaintiff's claims were not typical of
those that would be made by institutional investors, sophisticated individual investors, and arbitrageurs).
238. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974); Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp.
976 F.2d 497, 508-09 (9th Cir. 1992).
239. Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508; Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1025 (1991).
240. 838 F. Supp. 109, 113-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
241. See In re ML-Lee Acquisition Fund II, L.P. Sec. Litig., 149 ER.D. 506 (D. Del. 1993); Feldman
v. Motorola, Inc., No. 90 C 5887, 1992 WL 137163 (N.D. IIl. June 10, 1992). But see Burstein v. Applied
Extrusion Technologies, 153 F.R.D. 488 (D. Mass. 1994) (documents concerning plaintiffs' investment
histories irrelevant to typicality determination).
242. See, e.g., Welling v. Alexy, 155 F.R.D. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that shareholder who
appeared in 13 other securities class actions and who was unfamiliar with instant litigation failed typicality
requirement); In re Urcarco Sec. Litig., 148 F.R.D. 561, 563 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1993), aff'd sub noma. Melder
v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097 (5th Cir. 1994); Shields v. Smith, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,449 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1991) ("The consistent pattern of purchasing a few shares in troubled
companies, Plaintiff's involvement in over two dozen lawsuits, and his purchase of ABI shares after the
company's disclosures of some short-term problems, supports an interpretation that Plaintiff's motive in
purchasing two shares in ABI was to pursue a lawsuit." (footnote omitted)). But cf. Wells v. HBO & Co..
[1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,009 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 1991) (concluding that fact
that proposed class representative served as class representative on other cases made her good candidate
for position).
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the door to similar "boxcar discovery" absent evidence suggesting a given
named plaintiff was so motivated. The risk that they might be required to
comply with similar discovery requests deters institutional investors from
seeking to become lead plaintiffs in class actions. The cost of producing all
documents concerning an institution's investment philosophy and trading over
several years would be substantial. An institution also might be concerned
about disclosure of proprietary information, although use of confidentiality
stipulations and protective orders could alleviate most such concerns .
3
C. Procedural Obstacles to Secondary Participation
1. Intervention
Lack of notice that a class action is pending and of information about the
progress of a pending case makes it difficult for class members to determine
whether intervention is necessary to protect their interests. Moreover, courts
are unlikely to grant applications to intervene in class actions because they
require courts to reverse themselves in two respects. First, when a court
certifies a class, it implicitly finds that a class action is superior to intervention
by putative class members4 4 Second, notice of a pending class action is
never given to putative class members prior to certification, so would-be
intervenors almost never appear until after a court also has found that named
plaintiffs will represent the interests of the class fairly and adequately. Under
Rule 24(a), a person seeking to intervene as of right must show that her
interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties. 45 Thus she
must persuade the court to reverse both its superiority determination and its
decision that the named plaintiff will adequately represent class members'
interests.246
243. The parties to class actions usually stipulate that they will treat as confidential all proprietary
information produced in discovery and use it only in the litigation. Them is no obvious reason why such
stipulations should not protect information produced by a named plaintiff.
244. See Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 92 F.R.D. 32. 50 (E.D. Va. 1981); see also FED. R_ CIv. P.
23(b)(3).
245. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) requires a person seeking to intervene as of right to show that
the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
246. See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1406. 1421 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(denying intervention as of right where court already concluded plaintiffs could fairly and adequately
represent interests of class), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990): Fielding v. Allen. 9 F.ILD. 106. 106-07
(S.D.N.Y 1949) (denying application to intervene in derivative action absent evidence that representation
by existing plaintiff would be inadequate).
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As concerns permissive intervention,247 courts have broad discretion.
Their primary concern is whether intervention will "unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."'248 The possibility that
intervention might derail or inhibit settlement discussions is sufficient ground
for denying permissive intervention.249 Again, lack of notice makes it
unlikely that an institution's application to intervene will be timely.
2. Objection
An institution inclined to object to a settlement faces two obstacles, one
informational, the other economic. As the general counsel to SWIB has pointed
out:
[S]eldom do we get much detail about the claims filed or progress of
settlement discussions until a deal has already been struck. If we want
to object, we must retain separate counsel, opt out of a settlement and
pursue a completely separate case or battle the company and class
counsel in opposing a settlement. Given the relatively short time
period in which decisions must be made, plaintiffs are almost never
in a position to risk challenging a settlement. It is difficult to
determine whether this results in companies being able to obtain more
favorable settlements (foreclosing larger claims) than would be the
case if real plaintiffs were more involved."
Objecting to settlements also has been a low-percentage proposition.
Courts can award attorneys' fees to objectors who improve the terms of
settlements,25' but courts rarely are receptive to objectors' claims1 2 and
usually force objectors to bear their own attorneys' fees. Whether courts would
react similarly to objections filed by institutional investors with significant
247. Permissive intervention requires only that the applicant have a conditional right to intervene
conferred by statute, or that "an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law
or fact in common." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
248. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b); see also Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1990)
(affirming denial of intervention).
249. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. at 1422.
250. Letter from Kurt N. Schacht to Sen. Pete V. Dominici, supra note 235, at 2. Court-approved
notices of settlement leave much to be desired. They disclose the size and source of the settlement fund,
but not the damages originally sought or the percentage of allowable losses class members are likely to
receive.
Obtaining information also can be a problem. Courts have discretion to grant or deny objectors'
requests to take discovery, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 464 (2d Cir. 1974), and if the
record in the case is comprehensive, as it often is by the time a case is settled, objectors find it difficult
to demonstrate a need for additional discovery, Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
251. See, e.g., White v. Auerbach, 500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1974); Gaines v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,376 (N.D. I11. 1980).
252. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 71-90.
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stakes in class actions is not clear,253 but risk-averse institutions have been
notably reluctant to test the waters.
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES IN CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES
Courts would benefit were institutional investors with large stakes in class
actions to serve as lead plaintiffs. Institutional investor plaintiffs would not
usurp the courts' functions, for judicial approval of settlements and attorney
fee awards still would be required. But institutional investors, by acting as
litigation monitors, should make it easier for courts to perform their tasks.
Institutions with large stakes in class actions have much the same interests as
the plaintiff class generally; thus, courts could be more confident that
settlements negotiated under the supervision of institutional plaintiffs were "fair
and reasonable" than is the case with settlements negotiated by unsupervised
plaintiffs' attorneys. Similarly, a court might well feel confident in assuming
that a fee arrangement an institutional investor had negotiated with its lawyers
before initiating a class action maximized those lawyers' incentives to
represent diligently the class' interests, reflected the deal a fully informed
client would negotiate, and thus presumptively was reasonable.
To create a procedural environment that facilitates service by institutional
investors as lead plaintiffs, courts must remove the existing obstacles to
institutional participation. Courts readily could do so. All that is required are
changes in courts' current approach to appointing lead counsel, providing
notice, and regulating discovery directed at typicality and reliance.
A. Appoint as Lead Counsel the Attorney of the "Most Adequate Plaintif'"
The key change relates to designation of lead counsel for the plaintiff
class. In any class action in which more than one class member seeks to serve
as lead plaintiff, a court should interpret Rule 23's requirement that a named
plaintiff be able to represent the class "adequately" to mean that it should
select as lead plaintiff the named plaintiff capable of "most adequately"
representing class members' interests. Further, because the named plaintiff or
group of plaintiffs with the largest financial stake in the outcome of an action
has the greatest economic incentive to monitor class counsel's performance
effectively, courts should adopt a presumption that that plaintiff or group will
"most adequately" represent class members' interests.2 Courts should
253. CalPERS has objected to settlements of corporate derivative suits, but has met with little reported
success. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991); see also In re Pacific Enters. Sec. Utig.. No.
94-55935, 1995 WL 49484, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1995) (reporting that Wells Fargo Bank, GE
Investments, IDS, Continental Trust, and Connecticut General Life Insurance objected to combined class
action and derivative settlement, which district court approved).
254. This practice would not conflict with Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels, 383 U.S. 363 (1966). often cited
inaccurately to support arguments that plaintiffs with little understanding of the facts or theories of their
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provide other putative plaintiffs with an opportunity to rebut this presumption,
but should allow them to do so only by demonstrating that the presumptively
"most adequate" plaintiff has a significant disqualifying conflict of interest or
is subject to unique defenses that would render it incapable of adequately
representing the classy s5
By so interpreting Rule 23, courts would alter dramatically the dynamics
of class action litigation. Market forces would be brought into play. A
plaintiffs' attorney who became aware of facts suggesting the existence of a
meritorious securities fraud claim would no longer find it necessary to race to
the courthouse. Rather, she probably first would investigate further to
determine whether other publicly available information supported the
apparently meritorious claim. Then she might attempt to ascertain which
investors had the largest stakes in the class for which the proposed action
could be brought and canvass those investors (who in most cases would be
institutions) to see if one or more of them would be interested in directing her
to initiate the proposed suit. Alternatively, she might file a well-researched
complaint in the name of a figurehead plaintiff in the hope that a class member
with a large claim would retain her to pursue the action.
Since facts suggesting the existence of securities fraud claims usually are
widely known, plaintiffs' attorneys frequently would find themselves
competing to be retained by institutional investors. That members of the
plaintiffs' bar, and perhaps other attorneys as well, would be attempting to
enlist institutional investors as potential lead plaintiffs should not be disturbing.
Plaintiffs' attorneys currently engage in functionally identical conduct with
regard to figurehead plaintiffs. Institutions, as experienced and sophisticated
consumers of legal services, are in little danger of succumbing to the kind of
pressure or influence at which the ethical proscription of in-person solicitation
is directed. Moreover, well-established law firms nowadays regularly engage
in genteel, but nonetheless aggressive, solicitation of institutional investors and
other clients.
We do not believe that it would be fruitful to try to predict exactly how
relationships between plaintiffs' attorneys and institutional investors are likely
claims and little incentive or ability to monitor the litigation can nonetheless be adequate class
representatives. That case dealt with the validity of Mrs. Surowitz's verification of a complaint filed in her
name, not class certification. Named plaintiffs with small stakes in an action still could qualify as adequate.
If no aspiring lead plaintiff in a given action had more than a claim of nominal value, the court might want
to select the lead plaintiff on some basis other than that we suggest.
255. Implicit in this proposal is the notion that only other class members, not defendants, should be
allowed to challenge whether a particular plaintiff can adequately represent the class. Under current
interpretations of the rules, courts have allowed defendants to contest a given plaintiff's adequacy and
typicality because other class members did not have sufficient incentives to incur the costs of litigating
those issues. Defendants, however, are interested in eliminating (or harassing) all class representatives, not
in protecting the interests of absent class members. See supra text accompanying note 236. Under the
proposed interpretation of Rule 23, these flawed proxies would no longer be allowed to question a given
plaintiff's adequacy or typicality.
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to evolve. One possibility is that many institutions, over time, will develop
continuing relationships with one or more plaintiffs' attorneys. Whatever the
pattern, plaintiffs' attorneys' reputations as effective advocates of investors'
interests will become increasingly important. That, in turn, should reduce
significantly the resources that institutions will need to devote to monitoring
their attorneys' prosecution of class actions in which they are involved.
The change we propose also will place institutional investors in a position
to negotiate fee arrangements with plaintiffs' lawyers before class actions are
initiated. Again, it is not feasible to predict exactly what those arrangements
will be. However, it may well be that they will differ substantially from the fee
structures that courts currently employ-generally awarding fees equal to a
declining percentage of whatever the plaintiff class recovers. An institution
might attempt to discourage its attorneys from pursuing strike suits by
stipulating that they will receive only a nominal fee if they settle for no more
than some minimum percentage (e.g., ten percent) of the damages initially
sought. To encourage its attorneys to pursue strong cases more vigorously, an
institution might agree to pay them an increasing portion of any recovery in
excess of some stipulated threshold (e.g., forty percent of the damages initially
sought).5 6
Our market-based proposal has clear advantages over two alternative
approaches others have proposed: Professors Macey and Miller's suggestion
that class members' claims be auctioned to the highest bidder1 7 and Melvyn
Weiss' suggestion for a "case organization period" in class actions where
multiple complaints have been filed.58 Auctions will do little to eliminate
strike suits, and, because of informational problems, are unlikely to provide
class members with adequate compensation when their claims are
meritorious. 59
Mr. Weiss' proposal is that courts establish a case organization or "cooling
off' period whenever duplicative class action complaints have been filed.
"[D]uring the Case Organization Period, counsel for plaintiffs in each
action ... [would] confer among themselves about organization of counsel for
prosecuting the multiple actions .... 260 This procedure might slow the race
256. Such an approach also would differ from that followed by Judge Walker in In re Oracle
Securities Litigation, 132 F.R.D. 538, 541, 548 (N.D. Cal. 1990). in which the court found that the most
reasonable fee structure was one providing for class counsel to receive a declining percentage of any
recovery.
257. See Macey & Miller, supra note 16. at 105-16; see also In re Oracle Sec. Lig.. 131 FR.D. 688.
690 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (requiring plaintiffs' attorneys to bid for lead counsel position).
258. Letter from Melvyn I. Weiss, Partner, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach. to Richard M.
Samans, Competitiveness Policy Council (May 31. 1994) (on file with authors).
259. See Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Denvative Lawsuits:
A Critical Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 423. 424-25 (1993). Auctions also do not -address the basic
structural problems that divorce settlements from the merits." Alexander, supra note 16, at 590.
260. Weiss Cooling-Off Period Recommendations: Special Procedure for Managing Securities Class
Actions § 2(e), in Letter from Melvyn I. Weiss to Richard M. Samans. supra note 258.
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to the courthouse somewhat, but would do little to ensure more effective
monitoring of plaintiffs' attorneys. Nor would it relieve courts of the task of
deciding, on an ex post basis, how to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys for their
efforts.
B. Provide Early Notice to Class Members with Large Claims
Rule 23 gives courts broad authority to "make appropriate orders.., for
the protection of... the class."26t Our second proposal is that courts use this
authority to require that early notice of the pendency of a putative class action
be provided to prospective class members with potentially large claims.
Specifically, shortly after any class action is filed, the court should order the
issuer whose securities are involved to prepare a list identifying the 100
investors who purchased or sold (as the case may warrant) the largest
accumulations of the relevant class of that issuer's securities during the class
period alleged in the complaint, together with the mailing addresses of those
investors or their nominees. 262 The court should require the issuer to furnish
that list to the first-filing lawyer or lawyers, who should be required (a) to
reimburse the issuer for its reasonable expenses in preparing the list; (b) to
prepare a notice advising class members of the pendency of the action and the
claims asserted; (c) to mail the notice to the investors on the list and to any
investor service organization that has registered with the SEC and made a bona
fide representation that it will circulate such information to its members or
subscribers;263 and (d) to publish the notice in The Wall Street Journal or a
comparable publication.
Such notice would give institutional and other investors with substantial
stakes in pending class actions an opportunity to decide whether they were
interested in participating in those actions, alone or with other investors, as
lead plaintiffs. If an institution decided to get involved, it could retain either
the lawyer who filed the action or some other attorney. Similarly, if several
institutions were interested in becoming involved, they could either compete
to become lead plaintiff or agree to work together.
Allowing the first-filing lawyer to send the notice to the 100 largest
prospective class members would provide that attorney an incentive-an
increased chance of employment-designed to counter any hesitation she might
have about doing the prefiling investigation and other work necessary to
prepare a complaint. Moreover, if the first-filing attorney is not retained by the
261. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
262. We assume that issuers will be able to use procedures similar to those they now employ to
determine to whom notice of a pending class action shall be sent.
263. For example, the Council of Institutional Investors, Institutional Shareholder Services, or the
Investor Responsibility Research Center.
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lead plaintiff, the court should award her a reasonable fee for her efforts
whenever the case results in a recovery for the plaintiff class.61
C. Regulate Discovery Directed at Typicality, Adequacy, and Reliance
Our third proposal deals with discovery directed at typicality and reliance.
In class actions in which institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs,
questions relating to typicality rarely should arise. As with questions
concerning whether a given institution is the "most adequate" plaintiff, 2 we
believe the right to conduct discovery relating to typicality and adequacy
should be limited to other members of the plaintiff class, so as to keep it from
becoming an expensive and abusive sideshow, intended to deter institutional
investors from prosecuting class actions. Moreover, other class members
should be allowed discovery concerning typicality and adequacy only where
they can demonstrate some reasonable basis for believing that a presumptively
adequate plaintiff would not be capable of representing the class effectively.
As to merits discovery relating to the presumption of reliance, courts
should balance defendants' legitimate need for discovery against the potential
for abuse. The best solution might be for courts to defer defendants' discovery
on this point to a remedy phase of the litigation.' Courts should also allow
institutional investor plaintiffs liberal use of confidentiality stipulations and
protective orders. 67
VII. WILL INSTITUTIONS ACT AS LITIGATION MONITORS?
If courts modify procedural rules and practices to create a litigation
environment more conducive to institutional investors serving as lead plaintiffs
in class actions, are institutions likely to do so? Given the agency costs now
associated with class actions and the large amount of potential damages one
264. See Gottlieb v. Barry, 43 F.3d 474, 488-89 (10th Cir. 1993) (reversing district court's decision
denying award of fee to attorneys who first filed class action, prosecuted action for 16 months, but were
not named lead counsel when class was certified and remanding with instructions to award fee). Appointing
as lead counsel the attorney selected by the "most adequate" plaintiff and providing early notice to investors
with potentially large claims should largely moot the need for secondary participation through intervention
and objection. Other class members with large claims will have meaningfully waived their opportunity to
participate and, in any event, should have fewer doubts about whether their interests are being represented
adequately.
265. See supra note 255.
266. We are not aware of any class action, conducted in the name of a figurehead plaintiff, in which
defendants have attempted to take discovery from other members of the plaintiff class. Thus, deferring
discovery on reliance as we suggest would not deprive defendants of rights they now exercise. Moreover
except in the rare case in which defendants have reason to believe an institution was trading on the basis
of inside information, defendants' pursuit of nonreliance claims amounts to little more than a "defendants
strike suit." See supra text accompanying notes 122-28.
267. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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or more institutions have at stake in almost every class action, one might
assume that institutions will be sure to step forward. We do not.
Procedural obstacles no doubt have discouraged institutional investors from
participating actively in class actions, but procedural obstacles alone almost
certainly do not explain institutions' passivity. The absence of any demand by
institutions for procedural changes itself suggests that institutions have been
content to remain passive. One can view the history of institutional investor
involvement in other corporate governance issues as supporting the same
conclusion. As Robert Pozen, general counsel of Fidelity Investments, recently
noted, not many institutions have elected to become more than "reluctant
activists.
' 268
As concerns class actions, though, the factors that have impeded
institutional activism on other corporate governance issues are largely
irrelevant. When dealing with other governance issues, institutions are limited
largely to acting through the corporate electoral process. 269 They must deal
with (a) collective action problems that make it difficult for them to prevail;
(b) free-rider problems that have similar effects; (c) concerns relating to
pressure from clients and, in the case of multibusiness institutions, customers;
(d) potential securities law liabilities; and (e) lack of access to corporations'
proxy statements.270
The dynamics of institutional investor activism with regard to class actions
would differ dramatically. An institution interested in becoming lead plaintiff
in a class action in which it had a large financial stake would not need the
support or cooperation of any other institution. Collective action and free-rider
issues thus would be irrelevant. So would concerns relating to securities law
liabilities and access to corporate proxy statements. Were courts to adopt
practices designed to encourage institutional investors to become lead
plaintiffs, only concerns about client and customer pressure would remain.
Those concerns are not inconsequential; indeed, they may account for
much of institutional investors' past passivity. But they should be much less
of a constraint with respect to participation in class actions than they are with
268. Robert Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan,-Feb. 1994,
at 140.
269. Some institutions have tried to influence corporate managers through "quiet negotiations." See
James A. White, Giant California Pension Fund Softens Approach to Influencing Corporations, WALL ST.
I., Oct. 7, 1991, at C9. At least one, CalPERS, has concluded that corporate managers are likely to take
it seriously only when it adopts a more confrontational strategy. See Susan Pulliam, Calpers Goes Over
CEOs' Heads in Its Quest for Higher Returns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1993, at Cl.
270. See Alfred F. Conard, Fiduciary Obligation of the Asset Manager, in PROXY VOTING OF PENSION
PLAN EQUrrY SECURITIES 86, 104 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1989). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity
Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991) (arguing
that regulations should encourage institutional monitoring); John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the
Institutional Investor: A Half-ime Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 851-52 (1994) [hereinafter Coffee,
Report]; Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism,
79 GEo. LJ. 445 (1991) (discussing collective action problems and agency costs in institutional shareholder
activism).
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respect to other governance issues .27  The important point again is that an
institution interested in becoming lead plaintiff in a class action would not
need other institutions' support or cooperation. If a handful of institutions
decided they were interested in serving as lead plaintiffs in class actions in
which they had substantial claims, other institutions' passivity would enhance,
not limit, the prospect that they would succeed.m Consequently, class
actions could prove to be a particularly attractive forum for activism by public
pension funds and other institutions that have demonstrated a willingness to
assume a disproportionately large share of the costs of activism on other
corporate governance issues.
2 7 3
Institutions that have the largest stakes in class actions also are likely to
conclude that they could realize disproportionately large benefits by becoming
lead plaintiffs. In general, institutional investors are more inclined to become
active on corporate governance issues where they can improve their
comparative performance. 74 If an institution is the largest member of a
plaintiff class, its losses due to the defendants' alleged fraud generally will be
larger than those of other institutions; the institution then will stand to gain
271. In conversations and correspondence with the authors, some plaintiffs' lawyers have disagreed.
One commented: "I do not believe your article adequately takes into account the difficult position with
which many-perhaps most-institutional investors are faced. They typically have a close relationship with
public companies and with investment bankers... [and] generally do not want to be perceived as hostile
to corporate management." Letter from Edward Labaton to Elliott Weiss. supra note 118, at 3-4.
272. The dynamic would be much the same as that which discourages individual shareholders (or their
attorneys) from waging proxy contests while encouraging them to initiate shareholder derivative suits. See
Elliott J. Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability. 34 BUS. LAW. 575. 586 (1979).
273. A number of institutions signaled an interest in becoming more involved in class actions during
the time this Article was in preparation. Perhaps most significant, the Council of Institutional Investors
circulated a request for proposals (RFP) asking private law firms to suggest terms on which they would
be prepared to represent the Council and its members in screening and participating in class action
litigation. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL. SECURITIES LITIGATION
COUNSEL (submissions due March 10, 1995). The RFP solicits "suggestions and proposals as to how [the
Council] or its members might play a more constructive and active role in the litigation process as a
litigation monitor/lead plaintiff or otherwise." Id. at 1. It notes that as fiduciaries. Council members "have
a duty to evaluate litigation to the extent it is necessary and prudent to rectify injury suffered by the
pension funds we manage." Id. The Council expressed an interest in "speeding the dismissal process of
nonmeritorious cases or... achieving higher awards in meritorious cases." Id.: see also Donovan. supra
note 235, at A6-A7.
In addition, on February 22, 1995, Professor Joseph Grundfest. acting on behalf of CalPERS. CREF
Stanford Management Company, and Wells Fargo Institutional Trust Company. sent a 23-page package of
material to plaintiff and defense counsel in class and derivative actions that had been brought against Intel
Corporation, relating to announced problems with Intel's "Pentium" microprocessor. The material argued
that neither action had merit and that both should be dismissed. Letter from Joseph Grundfest, Professor
of Law, Stanford Law School, to plaintiff and defense counsel (Feb. 22, 1995) (on file with authors). Both
actions were voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs' counsel. See Walsh. supra note 235. at 3. See generally
Coffee, Report, supra note 270, at 869-71 (discussing other circumstances in which institutions might play
leadership roles).
274. See Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior
Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2063-64 (1994) (discussing how institutional investors
are inclined to become active on governance issues affecting corporations in which they have larger than
average investments and to be passive on governance issues affecting corporations in which they have
smaller than average investments).
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comparatively more from a larger settlement than will other institutions.275
The prospect of such an improvement in comparative performance might well
lead some institutional investors to seek to become lead plaintiffs in those class
actions in which they have the largest stake.
Consideration of their fiduciary obligations also may lead many
institutional investors to decide that they should seek to serve as lead plaintiff
whenever they are eligible to do so.
A. Fiduciary Obligations
When speaking of fiduciary obligations, it is useful to distinguish between
institutional investors and their managers. It is the managers of institutional
investors, not the institutions themselves, that are fiduciaries. If the procedural
changes we propose are implemented, managers of institutions that are the
largest members of plaintiff classes are likely to find themselves in a
somewhat uncomfortable position. Instead, when such actions are initiated, the
institution probably will be approached by one or more plaintiffs' attorneys
seeking to enlist it to become lead plaintiff. If the institution's managers decide
not to act, they will need to make a specific decision to that effect. Such acts
of commission are more likely to give rise to concerns about possible liabilities
than are acts of omission, such as institutions' current practice of passively
depending on the efforts of attorneys representing figurehead plaintiffs.
Managers of most institutional investors are subject to the stringent
fiduciary rules applicable to trusts; managers of others are governed by the
somewhat more relaxed fiduciary standards applicable to corporations.
Nevertheless, while courts in general "are much more reluctant to intervene in
the management of a corporation than in the operation of a trust," '276 it seems
likely that courts will follow the same approach when reviewing the litigation-
related decisions of managers both of institutional investors formally subject
to trust law and of those, such as mutual funds and insurance companies,
governed by corporate law.
277
275. This might not always be the case. An institution could be the largest member of a plaintiff class
and still have a smaller portion of its portfolio invested in that security than most other institutions involved
in a class action. However, given the large percentage of the plaintiff class typically represented by the
largest claimant, this scenario appears unlikely.
276. David Hughes, Trust Principles and the Operation of a Trust-Controlled Corporation, 30 U.
TORONTO L.J. 151, 151 (1980).
277. In fact, much of the relevant case law dealing with a trustee's duty to bring suit is based on
General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 109 N.E. 96 (N.Y. 1915), a decision dealing with the fiduciary obligations
of a corporate director. See infra text accompanying notes 288-95.
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1. Trustee's Duty of Care
The Restatement, Trusts, 2 78 sets forth the basic principles governing a
fiduciary's obligations to pursue claims that a trust has the right to assert.'
In general, a fiduciary is responsible for investing and managing a trust's funds
"as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust."' 0 The fiduciary's duties
apply "not only in making investments but also in monitoring and reviewing
investments" ' and "in keeping informed of rights and opportunities
associated with those investments. 28 2
The Restatement provides that a fiduciary must "keep informed of the
bundle of rights and privileges associated with particular investments and make
a deliberate judgment as to the exercise--or nonexercise-of those rights and
privileges. '8 3 A fiduciary has a right to initiate and participate in litigation
on behalf of the trust. A fiduciary has a duty to "take reasonable steps to
realize on claims" that are the property of the trust, including claims in
tort,' but should do so only when she believes that the probable benefit to
the trust will exceed the costs the trust reasonably can expect to incur.' On
the other hand, a fiduciary "cannot properly abandon claims affecting the trust
property unless it reasonably appears that a suit would be futile or the expense
of litigation or the character of the claim would make it reasonable not to bring
suit.'' 216 A fiduciary also has the power to compromise on a claim of the
trust that she has asserted where such action is reasonable.?
The case law relating to a fiduciary's duty to bring suit to protect a trust's
interest in corporate stock is sparse. In large part, it builds on Judge Cardozo's
278. By "Restatement, Trusts," we mean RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS (1959) as superseded
in part by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (1992).
279. A person responsible for managing an institution's investments is a "fiduciary" for the institution.
to which we refer in this section as the "trust." The Restatement uses the term "trustee" rather than
"fiduciary." Neither the Restatement nor any of the leading treatises on trust law or the law governing
institutional investors discusses in any detail fiduciaries' obligations relating to litigation.
280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992) (Prudent Investor Rule).
281. Id. cmt b.
282. Id. cmt d. A trustee who possesses a greater than ordinary degree of skill or who "procured
appointment as trustee by expressly or impliedly representing that it possessed greater skill than that of an
individual of ordinary intelligence .... is liable for a loss that results from failure to make reasonably
diligent use of that skill." Id
283. Id. Reporter's Note cmt d (quoting A.A. Sommer. Jr. et al.. Corporate Social Responsiblity
Panel: The Role of the SEC, 28 BUS. LAW. 215. 219 (Special Issue Mar. 1973) (remarks of Bevis
Longstreth)).
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 177 (1959).
285. Id. cmt. c; see also id § 192 cmt. a (citation omitted):
The [manager] has a power as well as a duty to take such steps as are reasonable to
realize on claims which are a part of the [institution's] property. If the only reasonable step
under the circumstances would be to bring suit to enforce the claims, he has a duty to bring
such suit.
286. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 192 cmt. c (1959).
287. Id. cnt. a.
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opinion in General Rubber Co. v. Benedict,2 8 a decision dealing with the
analogous obligations of a corporate director. A parent corporation alleged that
one of its directors knew funds were being stolen from one of its wholly
owned subsidiaries, failed to apprise the parent of the theft, and should be held
liable to the parent for the loss it incurred in the value of that subsidiary.
Cardozo noted that while the claim was by a corporation against one of its
directors, "the legal problem would be the same if the plaintiff were a natural
person, and the defendant an executor or trustee. . . [or] if the plaintiff,
instead of being substantially the sole stockholder, were one stockholder
among many. '289 He held that the defendant director owed the parent
corporation a duty to take "the same care of its property that men of average
prudence take of their own property.' '211 More specifically, the director's
duty was to inform the parent of what he knew so that, in its role as a
shareholder, the parent could initiate remedial action.
Relying on Benedict, the New York Court of Appeals held in In re
Auditore's Will29' that a trustee was liable for failing to stop, or promptly
remedy, a misappropriation of funds from a corporation fifty percent owned
by a trust. In re Greenberg's Estate reached the same conclusion, holding a
trustee liable for his "negligent failure to prosecute enforceable rights" that the
trust had as a corporate shareholder.292 In re Davidson's Estate293 applied
similar reasoning to allow a trust beneficiary to pursue a claim against a trustee
for failing to assert the trust's right to challenge an unfair transaction involving
a corporation in which the trust was a minority shareholder.
These post-Benedict cases all involved claims against fiduciaries who had
been involved in, or benefited from, the transactions that injured the
corporation in which the trust held stock.294 However, the Minnesota
Supreme Court recently relied on the same principle to hold that the
beneficiaries of a trust could maintain a suit against the trustees for failing to
bring suit against persons who had fraudulently, through misrepresentations,
purchased stock from the trust.295 It thus seems clear that a fiduciary has a
duty to sue one whose fraud or misrepresentations cause a trust to incur a loss
in connection with its purchase or sale of corporate stock.
On the other hand, while a fiduciary must "take all reasonable steps to
realize claims held in trust," she need not act where it appears likely that a suit
288. 109 N.E. 96 (N.Y. 1915) (Cardozo, J.).
289. Id. at 97.
290. Id.
291. 164 N.E. 242 (N.Y. 1928).
292. 267 N.Y.S. 384, 387 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
293. 89 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
294. See also O'Hayer v. St. Aubin, 293 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 1968).
295. Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1990). The court characterized the claim the
trustees should have brought as derivative in nature. Id at 137-38. On the facts given, however, it appears
that the claim actually could have been brought as a direct claim by the trust.
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will fail or that the expenses involved in bringing suit will be disproportionate
to any recovery the trust is likely to realize.296 Absent self-dealing, which
insures close judicial scrutiny,297 it is unclear what approach courts will
employ to review decisions by fiduciaries not to sue. Some authority indicates
that courts will give considerable deference to such decisions; '  other
authority indicates that they may review such decisions de novo and surcharge
fiduciaries who they conclude have acted imprudently.'
The standard under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)3  is much the same as that established by common law."'
ERISA § 404(a)(1) defines a pension fund manager's duties as follows:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims ....
The principal difference between this standard and the common law appears
to be ERISA's reference to "a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters," which seems to require an ERISA fiduciary to
possess a level of expertise greater than that of the "ordinary prudent investor."
However, the Restatement imposes a similar requirement on a fiduciary who
possesses a greater-than-ordinary degree of skill or who obtained appointment
as a fiduciary by holding herself out as possessing a greater-than-ordinary
296. Richards v. Midkiff, 396 P.2d 49 (Haw. 1964); see also Bullis v. DuPage Trust Co.. 391 N.E.2d
227, 231 (Ii. App. Ct 1979); Estate of Stetson, 345 A.2d 679 (Pa. 1975).
297. See infra text accompanying notes 314-23.
298. See In re Sackler, 596 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Div. 1993) (declining to interfcre with trstee's
decision not to initiate litigation); cf. Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (administration of trust
subject to correction only if trustee's actions are arbitrary and capricious). cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964
(1964); In re Estate of Geffen, 202 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sur. CL 1960) (refusing to order trustee to discontinue
lawsuit because "court may not interfere with the exercise of judgment and discretion on the part of a
fiduciary"). Moreover, if the fiduciary negligently fails to bring a claim on behalf of a trust, or is not
reasonably prudent in compromising or settling a claim, she still can avoid liability by proving that the trust
would have incurred the loss in any event. See Seven G Ranching Co. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson.
627 P.2d 1088 (Ariz. CL App. 1981).
299. In re San Juan Hotel Corp., 71 B.R. 413 (D.P.R. 1987) (surcharging trustee who wrote off
collectible accounts and failed to investigate misappropriation of trust property of corporation, of which he
had notice, for losses caused to trust), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 847 F.2d 931 (1988) (acknowledging
that trustee can be held liable for improper write-offs but finding that no such situation arose in case at
bar); RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TRusTs § 205(b) (1992); see In re Bank of New York. 323 N.E.2d 700
(N.Y. 1974) (surcharging trustee for loss on investment deemed imprudent): see also Stark v. United States
Trust Co., 445 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (analyzing investments individually, but holding none was
imprudent); Chase v. Pevear, 419 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1981) (same): In re Ncwhoff. 486 N.Y.S.2d 956
(App. Div.) (same), appeal denied, 489 N.E.2d 1302 (1985).
300. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
301. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch. 489 U.S. 101. 110 (1989).
302. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l).
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degree of skill.303 Most managers of institutional investors will possess such
skill or will have obtained appointment by holding themselves out as having
such skill.
An ERISA fiduciary's duties include the "duty to take reasonable steps to
realize on claims held in trust." In Central States, Southeast & Southwest
Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc.,3° the Supreme Court traced
this duty to the common law trustee's duty to preserve and maintain trust
assets.3 5 This duty includes the obligation to pursue minority shareholder
claims. 3°6
Canale v. Yegen 307 involved a fiduciary who had defrauded a corporation
owned by an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). The court held that it
was the fiduciary's failure to initiate a derivative suit against himself, not his
misappropriation of corporate funds, that constituted a breach of his duty to the
ESOP:
[W]here plan fiduciaries can be charged with knowledge of fraudulent
actions undertaken by an entity in which the plan has invested; and
a reasonably prudent person acting in a like capacity would conclude
that those fraudulent acts threaten to impair and diminish the value of
the plan's investment; and the plan administrator has a personal
interest in the accomplishment of those fraudulent acts; and the plan
administrator conceals the fact that those acts have occurred; and he
or she fails to protect the plan's assets from loss or dissipation
resulting from the fraud perpetrated by or on the entity in which it has
invested, then the administrator will be liable, under ERISA, for
breach of his or her fiduciary duties ..... 08
Similarly, Martin v. Feilen309 upheld claims against fiduciaries of an ESOP
for failing to initiate a derivative suit challenging the misappropriation of a
corporate opportunity by a corporation's principal shareholders and certain
transactions that a successor controlling shareholder effectuated for its sole or
primary benefit.
Canale and Martin both involved claims against fiduciaries of ESOPs, but
nothing in those decisions suggests that fiduciaries of other ERISA plans do
303. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. See generally Jane Kheel Stanley, The Definition of
a Fiduciary Under ERISA: Basic Principles, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR, J. 237 (1992) (discussing
applicable standards for defining fiduciary).
304. 472 U.S. 559 (1985).
305. See id. at 559-60; Donovan v. Bryans, 566 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also Ncdd
v. United Mine Workers, 556 F2d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (where
"trustee [of a union pension fund] may sue" to collect delinquent obligations to the funds and "wrongfully
fails to do so, the beneficiary may sue the trustee as well as the party or parties the trustee failed to sue").
306. Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456,
1468-69 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987).
307. 782 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.J. 1992).
308. Id. at 969.
309. 965 F2d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 979 (1993).
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not have the same obligations. Under ERISA, as at common law, a fiduciary
has a duty to consider initiating a suit where she becomes aware that the trust
has a valid claim in connection with trust property. The kinds of claims
typically asserted by class action plaintiffs-FOM, liability under § 11 and
§ 12(2) of the 1933 Act, and unfair treatment of corporate shareholders-all
would seem to qualify.
As is the case under common law, an ERISA trustee also must make a
judgment as to whether a trust is likely to benefit by prosecuting such a
claim. 30 Her decision will be "judged under the circumstances that existed
at the time the decision was made." 31' Even if an ERISA trustee acts
imprudently, she will not be held liable unless it can be proven that a decision
to initiate, or not to initiate, litigation caused the plan to incur a loss.? 2 But
an ERISA trustee who deals imprudently with the question of whether to
initiate litigation-for example, by devoting no thought to that question-could
be subjected to an appropriate equitable remedy, which might include removal
from office.313
As applied to class actions, these principles imply that the manager of an
institutional investor (including a pension fund subject to ERISA), on being
informed of the pendency of a class action or the possibility of initiating such
an action, first has a duty to determine whether the action appears to have
merit and is likely to result in a substantial recovery for the institution. If it
does, the manager then should consider whether the benefit the institution is
likely to realize from serving as lead plaintiff exceeds the probable cost to the
institution of such service. If the manager's decision is tainted by self-interest,
a court probably will not allow the manager much room to maneuver in
making this cost-benefit determination.
2. Trustee's Duty of Loyalty
An institutional manager's decision to participate in class action litigation
may cause the manager to incur litigation-related costs for which she has no
right to reimbursement under her management contract or which will
jeopardize her competitive position.3"4 Such a decision also may cause the
manager to incur the displeasure of clients or customers. The presence of either
of these factors could cause a court to impose on the manager the burden of
310. See McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 110 (3d Cir.). cert. dented. 479 US, 971 (1986).
311. Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co. Employee Stock Ownership Plan. 805 F Supp. 1475. 1482
(D. Minn. 1992). rev'd on other grounds. 16 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 1994).
312. See, e.g., Brock v. Robbins, 830 F.2d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 1987).
313. See id. at 647-48 (holding trustee who approved contract without appropriate study could be
subjected to appropriate equitable remedies, even though inattention caused fund no financial loss).
314. See Black & Coffee, supra note 274, at 2057: Coffee. Report. supra note 270. at 863-64.
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demonstrating that her decision not to participate in a class action advances the
trust's interests.
In re Estate of Rothko315 held that where a trustee might realize
reputational or career benefits from a decision, a sufficient conflict of interest
existed to invoke the duty of loyalty. The case law under ERISA is to similar
effect. In any situation in which an ERISA trustee arguably will benefit from
her decision not to initiate litigation, a court is likely to scrutinize that decision
considerably more closely than it would a comparable decision by a
disinterested trustee. ERISA § 404(a) requires an ERISA trustee to act solely
in the interests of a fund's beneficiaries and for their exclusive benefit.
1 6
Leigh v. Engle interpreted this charge to require an ERISA trustee, in a
situation where a potential conflict of interest exists, to pursue one of two
alternatives. If the potential for conflict is substantial, the trustee "may need
to step aside, at least temporarily, from the management of assets [in
question]." '317 Where the potential for conflict is less substantial, but "[w]here
it might be possible to question the fiduciaries' loyalty, they are obliged at a
minimum to engage in an intensive and scrupulous independent investigation
of their options to insure that they act in the best interests of the plan
beneficiaries., 318 Because the trustees in the case "undertook no genuinely
independent investigation of the trust's investment options" before making an
investment involving a possible conflict of interest, the Leigh court reversed
a decision exculpating those trustees from liability for losses the trust incurred
on the investment in question.31
No subsequent decision has considered how this principle applies to a
trustee's failure to initiate or participate in a class action, but two courts have
applied that principle to decisions involving how a pension plan should vote
315. 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
316. Some courts have held that a trustee's duties to a class, were it to become the lead plaintiff in
a class action, might conflict with the trustee's fiduciary duties. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank v. Chapman
& Cutler, 837 F.2d 775, 781-82 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that bank's obligations to class if it were approved
as representative would conflict with bank's duty as administrator to act for benefit of estate); Norman v.
Arcs Equities Corp., 72 FR.D. 502, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding ERISA § 1104 precludes ERISA plan
payment of costs associated with class action, except to extent they benefit plan's beneficiaries). Other
courts have rejected this line of argument. See, e.g., Kreuzfeld A.G. v. Camehammar, 138 F.R.D. 594, 600
(S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding that trustee not rendered incapable of acting as class representative so long as
other prerequisites for certification met); In re Pizza Time Theatre Sec. Litig., 112 F.R.D. 15, 22 (N.D. Cal.
1986) (holding that not all beneficiaries of plan had to agree in order for trust to act as class representative).
Any apparent conflict between an institution's fiduciary duties to its beneficiaries and a class
representative's fiduciary duties to class members is illusory, at least if plaintiffs' attorneys are prepared
to advance expenses for institutional investors as they now do for figurehead plaintiffs. Moreover, courts
have not interpreted ERISA to preclude a plan from taking actions that incidentally benefit third parties.
See, e.g., Trenton v. Scott Paper Co.. 832 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 (1988);
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 E2d 263, 271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). Thus, these
concerns should not lead courts to hold that institutional investors are not adequate class representatives.
317. 727 F.2d 113, 125 (7th Cir. 1984). The court based its analysis in large part on Donovan v.
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 271-72.
318. 727 F.2d at 125-26.
319. Id. at 129.
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stock. In O'Neill v. Davis,'20 the court refused to dismiss a challenge to the
ESOP trustees' decision to vote the approximately ninety percent of a
company's stock the ESOP owned in support of a plan to reconstitute the
company's board because it furthered the trustees' interests, not the interests
of plan participants. The court held that "the voting of Plan-owned shares by
the Plan's trustees was a fiduciary act under ERISA, and one which the
trustees were bound to exercise in the sole interests of the Plan
participants. ' 2 ' It therefore denied the trustees' motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint.
Newton v. Van Otterloo3z2 extended this principle. Plaintiffs challenged
a decision by ESOP trustees to abstain from voting the ESOP's stock at an
annual meeting of South Bend Lathe, Inc. (SBL). Because SBL's chief
executive owned almost all the remaining stock, the trustees' decision was
tantamount to voting to reelect management's candidates to the board and to
adopt a provision staggering the terms of SBL's directors. Plaintiffs, relying
on Leigh v. Engle, charged that the trustees violated their fiduciary duties
because as officers of SBL the trustees had a substantial conflict of interest.
The court first held that the Leigh analysis governed its evaluation of the
trustees' decisions on how to vote the ESOP's stock. Then it concluded that
although the trustees' conflict of interest was not so great as to require them
to delegate to others the voting decision, the trustees "at best, [had) divided
loyalties with respect to decisions on how to vote the ESOP's shares." 3
Because the trustees had not engaged in a suitably "intensive and scrupulous
independent investigation of their options," the court entered judgment against
them.
The results reached in Newton v. Van Otterloo and O'Neill v. Davis are
consistent with the position the Department of Labor has taken on the
responsibility of ERISA trustees to vote plan stock and otherwise manage plan
assets. Secretary William Brock stated in 1986:
With regard to corporate governance, plan fiduciaries cannot be
passive shareholders. Specifically, proxy votes that may effect the
economic value of plan investments unquestionably involve the
exercise of fiduciary responsibility. Those votes must be cast in a way
that a fiduciary believes will maximize the economic value of plan
holdings.3Z
320. 721 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
321. Id. at 1015.
322. 756 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
323. Id. at 1128.
324. William Brock, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Private Pension and
Welfare Plans (1986). quoted in Norman Stein, Trust Law and Pension Plans, in PROXY VOTING OF
PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURrrTEs. supra note 270, at 45.
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In what is generally referred to as the "Avon letter," the Department took
the position that voting corporate stock was a fiduciary act governed by
§ 404(a)(1). 325 The Department recently reaffirmed that an investment
manager whose responsibilities include voting plan-owned stock has a fiduciary
duty to determine how that stock should be voted and should not take voting
instructions from any other person.326 The Department also advised that an
investment manager's fiduciary responsibility to manage plan assets extends
beyond proxy voting to "active monitoring and communication with corporate
management... where the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is a
reasonable expectation that such activities by the plan alone, or together with
other shareholders, are likely to enhance the value of the plan's investment,
after taking into account the costs involved.,
327
All this has obvious implications for an ERISA trustee's decisions
concerning whether to initiate a class action on behalf of a plan or to become
a lead plaintiff. A trustee should make such a decision on her own and on the
merits; she should not follow the instructions of other persons. Moreover,
where a trustee has conflicting interests with respect to a decision to initiate
or become involved in a class action, how she should proceed depends on the
extent of the conflict. If it is serious, the trustee must delegate to others
decisions on how to proceed; if it is minor, the trustee must engage in
"intensive and scrupulous independent investigation of [her] options to insure
that [she] act[s] in the best interests of the plan beneficiaries."
B. Balancing Costs and Benefits
Almost never will an institutional investor's decision whether to get
involved in a class action determine whether that action is brought. Absent
institutional participation, plaintiffs' attorneys no doubt will continue to rely
on figurehead plaintiffs to initiate class actions that they believe have merit.
Thus, the choice for institutional investors will be whether to become more
active participants in class actions or to continue to remain passive in class
actions brought in the name of figurehead plaintiffs. Three factors are likely
to influence the choices institutional investors make: how much better results
they would be likely to achieve, were they to begin serving as lead plaintiffs;
what costs they would be likely to incur to achieve such results; and what
threats of liability institutions would face were they to remain passive.
325. See Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 59
Fed. Reg. 38,860, 38,860-61 (1994).
326. See id. at 38,861.
327. Id. at 38,862. The Department stated that the same standard would apply whether a plan pursued
a strategy of actively managing investments or of buying and holding an "index fund" portfolio. Id. at
38,862 n.6.
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1. The Potential Benefits of Institutional Activism
We are confident that institutional investors could realize substantial
benefits by serving as lead plaintiffs in class actions. Courts, commentators,
and many institutional investors agree that excessive agency costs currently
infect class actions. The standard strategy for reducing agency costs is to find
the mechanism that best aligns the agent's interests with those of the
principal. 2s Rule 23 attempts to do this by requiring courts to approve
settlements and award attorneys' fees.
Institutions with the largest stakes in class actions are better situated than
plaintiffs' attorneys or courts to protect class members' interests. 3' Those
institutions' interests parallel the interests of the plaintiff class much more
closely than do the interests of plaintiffs' attorneys or district judges, the
parties now responsible for protecting the class. 330 Moreover, the size of
those institutions' stakes suggests they are likely to be reasonably diligent in
seeking to ensure that plaintiffs' counsel represent effectively their interests
and the interests of the plaintiff class.
The largest benefit of institutional supervision of class actions is likely to
be settlement terms that are more favorable to the plaintiff class, on average,
than those now negotiated by essentially unsupervised plaintiffs' attorneys."'
Arsam Co. v. Salomon Bros.332 suggests the kind of benefits institutional lead
328. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC SrRLCMTRE OF CORPORATE
LAW 9-11 (1991).
329. Recall that the largest claimant's allowable loss averages 13.1% of all class members' losses and
often amounts to several million dollars. The second largest claimant's allowable loss is about two-thirds
as large. Almost all these claimants are institutional investors. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
330. The greatest disparity between an institutional plaintiff's interests and those of class members is
likely to be in a situation where subclasses of plaintiffs have potentially competing interests. See. e.g., In
re Seagate Technology I1 Sec. Utig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Because of the potential
for conflicts created by the fraud-on-the-market theory and the out-of-pocket damages, the adequacy of
representation cannot be ascertained without examining the composition of the class."). While institutional
plaintiffs (or their attorneys) may be tempted to structure settlements to favor subclasses in which those
institutions have the largest stake, the potential conflicts involved in such situations are much more
transparent than those involved in class actions currently, and thus are much more amenable to effective
judicial oversight. For example, courts could appoint different lead plaintiffs to represent different
subclasses. That might represent a marked improvement over the current situation, where self-appointed
plaintiffs' attorneys often find themselves making Solomonic judgments concerning how a settlement fund
should be divided among subclasses of plaintiffs. For example, counsel for the plaintiff class in Tnef v. Dun
& Bradstreet Corp. agreed to a settlement that limited recovery to class members who had incurred an
economic loss on their investments. 840 F. Supp. 277. 281 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Substantial authonty
indicates that defrauded investors are entitled to recover the difference between the value of what they paid
and the value of what they received. See, e.g., Levine v. Seilon, Inc.. 439 F.2d 328. 334 (2d Cir. 1971).
In Dun & Bradstreet, class counsel justified his decision to allocate the settlement fund in this fashion as
a more equitable distribution of a limited fund. Letter from Edward Labaton to Elliott Weiss. supra note
118, at 2.
331. In addition, it seems highly unlikely that attorneys representing an institutional plaintiff would
propose a settlement including a reliance provision or that an institutional plaintiff would agree to such a
provision.
332. In re Revco Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 97.809 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 14, 1993).
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plaintiffs might produce. Arsam had purchased $1 million in high-yield notes
issued to finance a leveraged buyout of Revco. Salomon Brothers had
underwritten the notes and sold them primarily to institutional investors.
Shortly after the leveraged buyout, Revco was bankrupt. Arsam, which lost
$514,000 of its investment, became lead plaintiff in a class action against
Salomon Brothers and others.
After two and a half years of litigation, Salomon Brothers settled for
$29,750,000. The court characterized the benefits to the class from this partial
settlement as "enormous" and granted Arsam an incentive award of
$200,000. 33 A year after the settlement, other defendants settled for an
additional $6,235,000 and the court awarded Arsam a supplemental incentive
award of $90,000.
334
At the second settlement hearing, class counsel described Arsam's
participation as lead plaintiff as follows:
Mr. Phelan [a senior executive of Arsam] was the one that monitored
the case for the first three years. Mr. Phelan .... until his retirement
in August of 1992, read every single paper and pleading in this case.
If something didn't get to him on time, he was on the phone calling
me or [one of my associates] up to say "Where is this paper? I want
to read it." He often contributed his ... input and closely supervised
class counsel. He really performed in an admirable role.
I think this was a labor of princip[le] as well as money for them
because they felt that Solomon [sic] Brothers primarily and others did
wrong in this case, and they were willing to commence a class
action.335
If institutions were to adopt a systemic perspective when they negotiate fee
arrangements, they also might be able to discourage their lawyers from
pursuing strike suits. Strike suits can result in modest recoveries for members
of the plaintiff class, but they also impose substantial costs directly on
defendant corporations and indirectly on those corporations' shareholders.336
Consequently, an investor with a diversified portfolio, viewing such suits ex
ante, would want to discourage them.
An institutional investor might be able to achieve that result by agreeing
to pay class counsel only a nominal fee if counsel proposes to settle the case
for less than an amount approximating defendants' estimated defense costs.
Such a fee arrangement should discourage counsel from exploiting the most
333. Id.
334. In re Revco Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,810 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 14, 1993).
335. ld.
336. Strike suits also impede rather than advance the policies underlying the federal securities laws.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-37.
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common strike suit situation-one in which plaintiff files an apparently
meritorious complaint and then learns, through discovery, that the action lacks
merit.337 If such a fee arrangement did not prove to be an effective deterrent,
more effective fee arrangements might well evolve over time.
Institutions also might decide that they, and investors generally, would be
better off if fewer class actions were settled.338 Adjudication serves two
distinct purposes: dispute resolution and rulemaking. 339 Settlements resolve
disputes but do nothing to clarify substantive law. The substantive issues courts
address when ruling on pretrial motions in class actions-materiality and
scienter-involve mixed questions of fact and law. A decision not to dismiss
a complaint or to deny a motion for summary judgment provides little
guidance as to the court's view of the governing substantive standard. It only
tells the parties-and the world-that the allegations in the complaint or the
evidence produced by plaintiff are sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to
whether certain information is material or certain defendants acted with
scienter. Uncertainty abounds.?4
"[F]rom a social viewpoint, trials are a mechanism... for interpreting and
creating laws to regulate and govern society."'' There is a public, or
systemic benefit to having courts reach decisions on the merits, because they
serve to clarify for all participants in the system how courts will interpret the
rules applicable to their conduct. Reducing uncertainty reduces transaction
costs. Clarifying the rules governing corporations' disclosure responsibilities
should reduce corporations' costs. Institutional investors would be prime
beneficiaries because they hold widely diversified portfolios; what benefits
corporations also benefits them. Realizing that, institutions acting as lead
plaintiffs might well decide that more actions should be tried on the merits.
They could then negotiate fee arrangements with their attorneys that took
account of that possibility.
4 2
337. Such a fee arrangement would give class counsel an incentive to press for a settlement above the
threshold amount, but defendants presumably would refuse, preferring to incur the lower cost of litigating
a case that they feel confident of winning. See supra note 173.
338. This also would reflect concern about the systemic impact of class actions.
339. Robert D. Coater & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067. 1070 (1989); cf. Owen Fiss. Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ.
1073, 1085 (1984).
340. See JAMES D. CoX Er AL. SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 62 (1991)
("Determining what is material is a normative judgment having the same level of precision as determining
what the reasonable person would do under the circumstances."); id. at 739 (discussing ambiguities in the
cases defining scienter).
341. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 339. at 1070.
342. An attorney working on a contingent fee basis faces a greater risk if she knows her client is likely
to want her to take a case to trial. We assume that the fee arrangements that institutions work out with their
attorneys would reflect those added risks in some appropriate fashion.
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2. The Potential Costs
The litigation-related costs an institutional investor that becomes a lead
plaintiff is likely to incur should exceed only modestly the costs it would bear
as a passive member of the plaintiff class. We assume that attorneys will be
prepared to represent institutional lead plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis and
to advance litigation costs as plaintiffs' attorneys now do for nominal
plaintiffs.34
The incremental costs an institutional plaintiff is likely to incur relate to
monitoring and to discovery.' The cost of monitoring lead counsel should
be modest. If the process for appointing lead counsel is modified as we
suggest, attorneys interested in representing institutional plaintiffs in class
actions will recognize that to compete successfully for clients, they will need
to enhance and protect their reputations as investors' "faithful champions."
That will align their interests more closely with the interests of class members,
which, in turn, will mitigate considerably the burden of monitoring how they
prosecute class actions. Detailed monitoring of the kind involved in Arsam
should not often be necessary.
Similarly, institutions' incremental costs relating to discovery should not
be too large. The relevant attorneys' fees could be covered, as they now are,
by the fee arrangements institutions make with the lawyers they select to
represent the class 45 Institutions will incur other costs; their personnel will
spend time locating and producing documents, preparing for depositions, and
the like. But, as Arsam illustrates, courts grant expenses and incentive awards
to plaintiffs in some class actions. 6 We see no reason why they would not
do the same for institutional plaintiffs.
343. A plaintiffs' lawyer can advance expenses to a client with repayment contingent on the outcome
of the litigation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(e)(1) (1989). Kirchoff v. Flynn,
786 F.2d 320, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1986), explains the circumstances in which a contingency fee arrangement
optimally aligns the interests of lawyer and client. Securities class actions are one such group of cases. Of
course, in any given case an institution might conclude that its interests and the interests of the plaintiff
class would be better protected by alternative fee arrangements.
344. We assume that institutions would avoid foolish actions such as those involved in Anita Founds.,
Inc. v. ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund, 902 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1990). There, a pension fund attempted to
reopen a settlement it had reached with defendant on the point at issue. The courts ordered the fund to pay
defendants' attorneys' fees for having initiated such frivolous litigation.
345. That is, plaintiffs' attorneys presumably would continue to represent lead plaintiffs during
discovery as part of their contingency fee arrangement.
346. See, e.g., In re Revco Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,809 (N.D.
Ohio Sept. 14, 1993); In re Surgical Laser Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. A. No. 91-2478, 1992 WL
328809, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1992); Enterprise Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137
F.R.D. 240, 250-51 (S.D. Ohio 1991); In re VMS Ltd. Partnership Sec. Litig., No. 90 C 2412, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9624, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1991); In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer
Litig., 130 F.R.D. 366,373-74 (S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Smithkline Beckman Corp. Sec. Litig., 751 F. Supp.
525, 534-35 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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3. Concerns About Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
It seems almost certain that institutional investors would realize substantial
net benefit by serving as lead plaintiffs in class actions, if courts were to
implement the procedural changes we propose. Institutions are likely to incur
only minor costs, which could be offset by court-awarded incentive fees in
cases where institutional plaintiffs' efforts contribute to substantial recoveries.
Whether institutions would act remains an open question. Some institutions
may have remained passive in the past because they shared the widely held but
mistaken belief that neither they nor other members of plaintiff classes have
stakes in class actions large enough to justify becoming involved. 7 With
timely information about class actions in which they have large stakes, they
might well decide that a more activist strategy would better advance their
interests, especially with respect to the two or three class actions a year in
which any given institution is likely to be the largest claimant. 4
Many institutional investors, however, are likely to change course only if
continued passivity subjects them to some threat of liability. The procedural
changes we propose, if implemented by the courts and acted upon by
plaintiffs' lawyers, should lead to creation of at least a modest threat.
Institutional investors now can justify remaining passive with respect to
class actions affecting their rights by pointing out that they are unaware of the
pendency of such suits or that seeking to become actively involved in cases
already under way is likely to be an expensive and ultimately futile
proposition. But if courts create the procedural environment we propose,
institutions will no longer be able to rely on that line of argument. With
respect to class actions in which they have the largest stake of any class
member, plaintiffs' attorneys are likely to confront institutions with requests
that they become lead plaintiffs. Institutions then will have to make, and may
well feel the need to document, explicit decisions concerning whether or not
to get involved. Absent some valid grounds on which to base decisions to
remain passive, risk-averse institutions may well conclude that applying to be
named class representative is the safest course.
Two developments could increase the pressure on institutions. 49 First,
courts could hold that an institution's decision not to serve as lead plaintiff
347. For example, the General Counsel of SWIB, which has been quite active on other corporate
governance issues, recently wrote, "There is typically no plaintiff with a large enough interest to provide
the guidance of a real client and counterbalance the interests of plaintiffs' counsel.- Letter from Kurt N.
Schacht to Sen. Pete V. Dominici, supra note 235, at 2. Yet SWIB had large stakes in several class actions
in one recent year, including the largest stake in at least one action. Rykoff-Sexon. See supra text
accompanying note 207.
348. See supra note 273.
349. Changes in institutional investors' processes are most likely to occur when external pressures are
brought to bear on fiduciaries. Cf. BEvis LONGSTRETH. MODERN INVES'mEN' MANAGEMENT AND THE
PRUDENT MAN RuLE 21 (1986).
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violated its duty of care or, more likely, its duty of loyalty.350 Second, the
Department of Labor could issue guidance to ERISA fiduciaries concerning
their responsibilities with respect to class actions similar in tone to the
guidance the Department recently issued relating to proxy voting and other
corporate governance issues.351 Faced with such guidance, institutions would
be likely to devote significant resources to reviewing and/or participating in
class action litigation, as they now do with respect to proxy voting.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Class actions under the federal securities laws have been a prominent
feature of the American legal landscape for more than three decades.
Originally conceived as a necessary supplement to the SEC's efforts to deter
securities fraud,352 class actions also have become the principal vehicle for
compensating investors injured by securities fraud.
In recent years, the belief has grown that the primary function served by
class actions is not the protection of investors but the enrichment of plaintiffs'
attorneys who initiate and then prosecute such suits, without meaningful client
supervision and primarily to advance their own interests. Current congressional
reform proposals are directed at the problem of legitimacy posed by such
litigation. Bills now pending in Congress would require courts hearing class
actions to appoint a guardian ad litem or plaintiff steering committee for the
class; would limit the number of class action complaints that "professional"
plaintiffs can file annually; and would disqualify as class action plaintiffs
investors with only trivial amounts at stake.353
These reform measures attempt to ensure that plaintiffs' attorneys do a
better job of representing class members' interests, and to restore to class
actions the legitimacy that many people believe they now lack. The reforms
proposed in this Article would do a better job of restoring legitimacy to class
actions. By changing their practices relating to selection of lead counsel,
notice, and discovery by defendants, courts could make it much easier for
institutional investors to serve as class representatives. Those investors have
the knowledge and financial sophistication necessary to serve as effective
litigation monitors. Their stake in the outcome of class actions would give
them an incentive to do that job well. Suits brought or controlled by major
350. For example, a court might conclude that an institutional investor's manager faced a conflict of
interest because the manager did not have a clear right to be reimbursed for any incremental costs the
manager might incur by serving as a lead plaintiff, and that the manager had not carried the burden of
proving that her decision to remain passive was in the best interests of the institution. See supra text
accompanying notes 316-23.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 325-27.
352. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
353. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202, 203 (1995); Securities Litigation Reform Topic of
Separate House, Senate Legislation, supra note 6.
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financial institutions, we believe, would be perceived as much more legitimate
than suits brought in the name of figurehead plaintiffs.
The possibility that institutions will seek to serve as lead plaintiffs could
be further enhanced by judicial decisions or Department of Labor
pronouncements clarifying that those who manage institutional investors have
a fiduciary responsibility to give serious consideration to serving as class
representatives in cases where they are eligible to do so.
The first steps, however, must be taken by the courts. A federal district
judge acting sua sponte in some given class action could adopt the practices
we propose relating to selection of lead counsel, notice, and discovery by
defendants, much as Judge Walker did when he auctioned off the lead plaintiff
position in Oracle. Institutional investors or the SEC could move to have
courts implement these practices in a pending case. A judicial task force or an
appellate court could implement these practices on a circuit-wide or national
basis. Whatever the mechanism by which these changes are made, we believe
they will bear substantial fruit. The time has come for the courts to act.
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